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NO. 35285
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HONORABLE Jeff Brudie
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State Appellate Public Defender
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IDAHO COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
FILED
A T ~ Q C L O C K

DEC - 4 2006
URT
DEPUTY

JONATHON D. HALLIN
WILCOX & MALLIN. PLLC
Attorneys at Law
200 Park Street
P.O. Box 947
McCall, Idaho 83638
Telephone: (208) 634-71 18
Facsimile: (208) 634-5880
wilcox.hallin@frontiernet.net
ISB # 7253

1,

Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAJ3O
STATE OF IDAHO,

)

1

Plaintiff,

)
)
)
)

VS.

)
)

Defendant.

County of Idaho

AFFIDAVIT OF JONATHON D.
HALLlN IN SUPPORT OF
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
VACATE TRIAL SETTING

1

JAMES A. COCHRAN,

STATE OF IDAHO

Case No. CR-2006-32068

)
) ss.
)

JONATHON DAVID HALLIN, being first duly sworn on his oath, deposes and says as
follows:

AFFIDAVIT OF JONATHON D. HALLIN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO VACATE TRIAL SETTING - Page 1

" -*

That 1 am a member of the firm WILGOX & HALLIN, PLLC, Defendant's
counsel of record in the above-entitled action, and consequently have personal
knowledge concerning the facts of this case.
That on September 29,2006, this firm was appointed to represent Mr. Cochran in
the above-captioned matter.
That on November 20,2006,I had a conference with Mr. Cochran in anticipation
of the Jury Trial scheduled in this matter on December 18,2006.
During said conference, Mr. Cochran advised me that he had recently learned of
two other persons whom may have been accused of similar behavior by the
alleged victim in this matter.
That Mr. Cochran informed Counsel that said persons are Fred Hendron, believed
to be residing at McCoy's Trailer Court, Kooskia, Idaho, and Mr. Hixon, whom is
believed to reside in Washington State.
That I advised my client to diligently attempt to locate a full name for Mr. Hixon
and his place of residence.
To date, Mr. Hixon has not been located, nor has his full name been determined.
That Mr. Cochran informed counsel that Mr. Hendron is reluctant to either testify
or speak with counsel regarding this matter.
At this juncture, Counsel believes that Mr. Hixon and Mr. Hendron are material
witnesses.
At this juncture, Counsel does not reasonably believe that he will be able to locate
Mr. Hixon, interview him, and possibly have him subpoenaed, prior to December
18,2006.
Further, Counsel reasonably believes that the assistance of a private investigator is
necessary to locate Mr. Hixon.
After exercising due diligence, Counsel has determined that he cannot reasonably
be prepared by December 18,2006, the current trial setting in this matter.
That Counsel has spoken with Mr. Cochran about the foregoing, and he agrees
with Counsel's decision to request that the current trial setting be vacated and
reset.

AFFIDAVIT OF JONATHON D. HALLIN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
VACATE TRIAL SETTING - Page 2

14.

Based on the foregoing, Counsel requests that this matter be rescheduled.

Further sayeth naught

DATED this

f December, 2006.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this ?*day

of December, 2006.

AFFIDAVIT OF JONATHON D. HALLIN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
VACATE TRIAL SETTING - Page 3

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
of December, 2006, I caused a true and correct
I hereby certify that on the
copy of the above and foregoing document to be served by the method indicated below to the
following persons:
(x)
( )
( )
(x)
( )

U.S. Mail
Certified Mail
Federal Express
FacsirniIe
Hand Delivery

. .

Justin D. Whatcott
Idaho Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83702
Boise, Idaho 83702-00 10
Facsimile: (208) 334-2942

SIGNED:

AFFIDAVIT OF JONATHON D. HALLIN IN SUPPORT OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO
VACATE TRIAL SETTING - Page 4

JONATHON D. WALLIN
WILCOX & HALLIN, PLLC
Attorneys at Law
200 Park Street
P.O. Box 947
McCall, Idaho 83638
Telephone: (208) 634-71 18
Facsimile: (208) 634-5880
wilcox.hallin@frontiemet.net
ISB # 7253
Attorneys for Defendant

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

)

Case No. CR-2006-32068

)
)

DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY
INSTRUCTIONS (1 -5)

VS.

JAMES A. COCHRAN,
Defendant.

COMES NOW the Defendant, JAMES A. COCHRAN, by and through his attorney of
record, Jonathon D. Hallin, of the firm, Wilcox & Hallin, PLLC, and hereby submits his
proposed jury instructions Numbers 1 through 5.

DEFENDANT'S WQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Page 1

PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 1
Under our law and system of justice, the defendant is presumed to be innocent. The
presumption of innocence means two things.
First, the state has the burden of proving the defendant guilty. The state has that burden
throughout the trial. The defendant is never required to prove his innocence, nor does the
defendant ever have to produce any evidence at all.
Second, the state must prove the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. A reasonable
doubt is not a mere possible or imaginary doubt. It is a doubt based on reason and common
sense. It is the kind of doubt which would make an ordinary person hesitant to act in the most
important affairs of his or her own life. If after considering all the evidence you have a reasonable
doubt about the defendant's guilt, you must find the defendant not guilty.

GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER

ICJI 103A

DEFENDANT'S E Q U E S T E D JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Page 2

PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 2
A defendmt in a criminal trial has a constitutional right not to be compelled to testiQ.
The decision whether to testify is left to the defendant, acting with the advice m d assistance of
the defendant's lawyer. You must not draw any inference of guilt from the fact that the defendant
does not testify, nor should this fact be discussed by you or enter into your deliberations in any
way.

GIVEN
EFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER

ICJI 301

DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Page 3

PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 3
As members of the jury, it is your duty to decide what the facts are and to apply those
facts to the law that I have given you. You are to decide the facts from all the evidence presented
in the case.
The evidence you are to consider consists of:

1. sworn testimony of witnesses;
2. exhibits which have been admitted into evidence; and

3. any facts to which the parties have stipulated.
Certain things you have heard or seen are not evidence, including:

1. arguments and statements by lawyers. The lawyers are not witnesses. What they say in
their opening statements, closing arguments and at other times is included to help you
interpret the evidence, but is not evidence. If the facts as you remember them differ from
the way the lawyers have stated them, follow your memory;

2. testimony that has been excluded or stricken, or which you have been instructed to
disregard;

3. anything you may have seen or heard when the court was not in session.
GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
ICJI 202
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Page 4

PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 4
You cannot find the defendant guilty of Lewd and Lascivious Conduct unless the
circumstances proved by the evidence are consistent with the theory that he committed the crime
charged and they cannot be reconciled with any rational theory of his innocence. If the evidence
is susceptible of two reasonable interpretations, one of which points to the defendant's guilt and
the other to his innocence, it is your duty to adopt that interpretation which points to the
defendant's innocence, and to reject the other which points to his guilt. In addition, each fact
which is essential to complete a set of circumstances necessary to estabIish the defendant's guilt
must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER

ICJI 203

DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Page 5

PROPOSED JURY WSTRUCTION NO. 5
"'Expert witness[es] may not give an opinion as to the credibility of a particular witness."
Consequendy, you shall disregard all testimony by all witnesses, lay andlor expert, which is
nothing more than an assessment of the alleged victim's credibility.
GIVEN
REFUSED
MODIFIED
COVERED
OTHER
Sfate v. Blachtead, 126 Idaho 14'2 1 (1 994), ICJI 302, us modified.

DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Page 6

SUBMITTED this >%y

o f February, 2007

VVIfiCOX & WALLIN, PLLC
By:
M m e y s for Defendant

DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Page 7

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
day of February, 2007,l caused a true and conect copy
I hereby certify that on the -1
of the above and foregoing document to be served by the method indicated below to the
following persons:
i

(x)
(
(
(
(
(

)
)
)
)
)

U.S.Mai1
Certified Mail
Federal Express
Facsimile
Hand Delivery
Box

Justin D. Whatcott
Idaho Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83702
Boise, Idaho 83702-00 10
Facsimile: (208) 334-2942

SIGNED:

DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS - Page 8

ORlGlNAL

dig*g
re2-
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IDAHO COUN["I' DISTRICT COilRT
f!!fD
- C! CI OCK

Pi

L.M.
FEB 1 4 2007

LAWRENCE G.WASDEN
Idaho Aftorney General
STEPHEN A. BYVVATER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division
JUSTIN D. WHATCOTT
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ldaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 332-3096

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
VS.

JAMES COCHRAN,
Defendant.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CR-06-32068
STATE'S REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTIONS

COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, appearing through Justin D. Whatcott, Deputy
Attorney General and Special Prosecuting Attorney for ldaho County, State of ldaho and
does hereby request the attached jury instructions be given in the above-entitled case.

DATED this

(2%day of February, 2007.

~&uQdttorne~ General

STATE'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Page 1

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this gfl day of

, 2007, 1 caused to be

served a true and correct copy of the foregoing State's Requested Jury Instructions to:
Jonathon Hallin
Wiicox & Hallin
200 Park Street
P.O. Box 947
McCall, ID 83638
Fax (208) 634-5880

$ U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid
-Hand Delivered
-Overnight Mail
-Facsimile

4l'osean Newman, Legal Secretary

STATE'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Page 2

INSTRUCTION NO.
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Lewd and Lascivious Conduct, the state
must prove each of the following:
1.

On or about the 3othday of March, 2006

2.

In the state of Idaho

3.

The defendant James Cochran committed an act of manual-genital contact upon
A.J.H.

4.

A.J.H. was a child under sixteen (16) years of age, and

5.

the defendant committed such act with the specific intent to arouse, appeal to, or
gratify the lust or passions or sexual desires of either of them.
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you

must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty.

INSTRUCTION NO.
It is alleged that the crime charged was committed "on or about" a certain date. If

you find the crime was committed, the proof need not show that it was committed on that
precise date.

INSTRUCTION NO.
To constitute lewd and lascivious conduct, it is not necessary that bare skin be
touched. The touching may be through the clothing.

INSTRUCTION NO.
The law does not require as an essential element of the crime that the lust,
passions, or sexual desires of either the defendant or A.J.H. be actually aroused,
appealed to, or gratified.

INSTRUCTION NO.
You are instructed that it is not a defense to the crime of Lewd and Lascivious
Conduct or to the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Minor that A.J.H. may have consented to
the alleged conduct.

INSTRUCTION NO,

If your unanimous verdict is that the defendant is not guilty of Lewd and Lascivious
Conduct, you must acquit the defendant of that charge. In that event, you must next
consider the included offense of Sexual Abuse of a Minor.

INSTRUCTION NO.
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Sexual Abuse of a Child, the state must
prove each of the following:
1. On or about the 3othday of March, 2006,
2. In the state of Idaho
3. The defendant James Cochran caused or had sexual contact with A.J.H., not
amounting to lewd conduct
4. The defendant was eighteen (18) years of age or older,

5. A.J.H. was under sixteen (16) years of age, and
6. The defendant did such act with the specific intent to gratify the sexual desire of the
defendant, of such child, or of some other person.
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you
must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty.

INSTRUCTION NO.
In these jury instructions, the following words have the meanings stated:

"Sexual contact" means any physical contact between the child and the actor, or between
children which is caused by the actor, or the actor causing the child to have self contact,
any of which is intended to gratify the lust or sexual desire of the actor or some other
person.

INSTRUCTION NO.
In this case you will return a verdict, consisting of a series of questions. Although
the explanations on the verdict form are self explanatory, they are part of my instructions
to you. I will now read the verdict form to you. It states:
"We, the Jury, for our verdict, unanimously answer the questions submitted to us
as follows:
QUESTION NO. 1: Is James Cochran not guilty or guilty of Lewd and Lascivious
Conduct in Count I?
Not Guilty

Guilty

If you unanimously answered Question No. 1 "Guilty", then you should simply
sign the verdict form and advise the bailiff. If you unanimously answered Question No. I
"Not Guilty", then you should proceed to answer Question No. 2.
QUESTION NO. 2: Is James Cochran not guilty or guilty of Sexual Abuse of a
Minor in Count I?
Not Guilty

Guilty

The verdict form then has a place for it to be dated and signed. You should sign
the verdict form as explained in another instruction.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
VS.

Case No. CR-06-32068
VERDICT

1

JAMES COCHRAN,
Defendant.

)
)
)

We, the Jury, duly empaneled and sworn to try the above entitled action, for
our verdict, unanimously answer the question(s) submitted to us as follows:
QUESTION NO. 1: Is James Cochran not guilty or guilty of Lewd and

Lascivious Conduct in Count I?
Not Guilty

Guilty

If you unanimously answered Question No. 1 "Guilty", then you should
simply sign the verdict form and advise the bailiff. If you unanimously answered
Question No. 1 "Not Guilty", then you should proceed to answer Question No. 2.
QUESTION NO. 2: Is James Cochran not guilty or guilty of Sexual Abuse

of a Minor in Count I?
Not Guilty

Guilty

Next, you should simply sign the verdict form and advise the bailiff.
DATED this

day of

Presiding Juror

,2006

p

AT

FILED

/

1

* \ l dO'CLOCK

ldaho Attorney General

STEPHEN A. BYWATER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division
JUSTIN D. WHATCOm
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ldaho 83720-00 10
Telephone: (208) 332-3096
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
THE STATE OF IDAHO,

Case No. CR-06-32068

Plaintiff,

STATE'S OBJECTION TO
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTIONS

VS.
JAMES COCHRAN,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, appearing through Justin D. Whatcott, Deputy
Attorney General and Special Prosecuting Attorney for ldaho County, State of ldaho and
does hereby object to the Defendant's proposed jury instructions 4 and 5, upon the
following grounds:
1. The Defendant's proposed jury instruction 4 is an instruction known as the
"Holder" instruction, listed as lCJl 203, and arising from State v. Holder, 100 ldaho
129, 594 P.2d 639 (1979). The decision in Holder was overruled in State v.
Humphrevs, 134 ldaho 657, 8 P.3d 652 (2000). As such, lCJl 203 now states

STATE'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Page 1
--=
-s%

--,.. ' 1

C%
1

&

*

.M,

"That instruction, which became known as the "Holder" instruction, should no
longer be given." Therefore, the "Holder" instruction is no longer good law in Idaho
and thus the Defendant's proposed jury instruction 4 should not be given.

2. The Defendant's proposed instruction 5 purports to instruct the jury to disregard
any testimony which is a comment on the alleged victim's credibility. Due to the
fact that no witness is permitted to testify regarding opinions as to the credibility of
any other witnesses, such evidence is not admissible. As such, the Court should
prevent any such testimony, and the Defendant's proposed instruction 5 is
unnecessary. In the event that testimony of this type is elicited, the Court can
instruct the jury to disregard that testimony at that time.

Therefore, the State respectfully requests that the Court deny the Defendant's
proposed jury instructions 4 and 5. Additional oral argument regarding this request shall
be made at the jury instruction conference held prior to the instructing of the jury in this
case.

DATED this lzUday of February, 2007.

DB ut

fdAttorney General

STATE'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Page 2
a**
We

26

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
ay of

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

2007, 1 caused to be

served a true and correct copy of the foregoing State's Objection to Defendant's
Requested Jury Instructions to:

'

-U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid
-Hand Delivered
-Overnight Mail
-Facsimile

Jonathon Hallin
Wilcox & Hallin
200 Park Street
P.O. Box 947
McCall, ID 83638
Fax (208) 634-5880

/

w o s e a n Newman, Legal Secretary

STATE'S OBJECTION TO DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS
Page 3
L kf,
& 'i*I
'
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D&NNV J RADAKOVICW

PAGE

IDAI-10 COLbJTY EISTRICT CQURT

ROSk f GLtiFIING

O f - q S l l i l C TCOURT

D m y J, Radalcovich
Radakovich b w Office
Attorney for Def'endmt
1624 C Street
Lewiston, Id&o 83501
(208) 746-8 162
Idaho State Bar #I 991

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
TEE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
STATE OF DmO,

CASE NO. CR 2006-32068

)

1
Plaintiff,
v.

1
1
1

AFFIDAVIT OF
DANNY J. UDAKOVICH

)

J M S A. COCHRAN,
Defendant.

D
1.

1
1
1

M J. RADAKOVICH, being f i t duly sworn, on oath deposes and says:
That your afiant has been retained as the attorney for the Defmdant in the above-

entitled matter;
2.

That the Defendant consulted with your affiant in early December 2006 relative to

the drafting of ~elrtaintort claim notices;
3.

That, at the time the Defendant consulted with your aMiant relative to the tort claim

notices, the Defmdant made inquiry of your affiant as to whether ox not your

AFFDAVII' OX:
RAPJNY J. RADBf(0VXCII

1

would be

RADAKOVICR LAW OFFICE
1624 G Street
Lewkton, ID 83501

04

DAWY

J RADAKDVICH

PAGE

w i l k g to represent him in the underlying criminal. proceedings; that, at that time, your af"X"1mtquoted
the Dewdant a retainer which would need to be paid before your affiant would c o m m c e

rvesentation of the Defeadant in said criminal matters;
4.

That the retainer was substantial md, based on what the Defendant has indicated to

your affiant, it required a considerable period of time for the Def~ndmtactually accumulate the

r e ~ n e x that
; the Defendwt. contacted your affiant during the week

of

February 12, 2007, and

indicated that the retainer had been accumulated; that the retainer was actually paid over to your
af%lanton February 15,2007;
5.

That your affiant immediately got into contact with Deputy Attorney General, Justin

Whatcott, to inform him that the Defendant had retained your afiant and, haddition, your affk.int
spoke with the Defendant's existing attorney, Jonathan Hallin, imd made mmgements for the
signing of a substitution of counsel document; that, at the same time, your affiant inquired of Mr.
Hallin as to whether or not he might bonow the file of Mr. Hallin in this matter; that Mx. Hallin was

willing to allow your affiant to bonow the file, which i s apparently being mailed to your affjiimt
today;
6.

That your affiant desires to do a proper job in representing the Defendant in said

matter; that the charge against the Defendant in said matter is serious and carries a significant
potential penalty; that your affiant believes that, given the delay in obtaining the file of Mr. HaXlin

and the fact that the file is quite large, requires that the trial in this matter be continued fof a period
of time in order to allow your afliant to properly prepare to try the case;
7.

Further your affiant saith not.

AFFXDAVXT OF
DANNY J. RADAKOVICH

RADAKOVECH LAW OFFICE
1624 G Scretl,
txwiston, ID 83501
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STATE OFDAHO
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SS.

County of N ~ Perce
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J. RmAKOVICH, being f i s t duly sworn, on his oath deposes and says:

That he has read the foregoing document and we
therein stated are true, as he vetily believes.
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My co~nmissionexpires. on March 13, 2012.

J hereby certify that a true and correct
copy of the foregoing instrument was
faxed to:

Justin D.Mutcott
Deputy Attorney Generul
P.0.Box 83 720

RADAKOVICH L A W OFFICE
1624 C; Street,
Lewistvs. 11) 85501

MAY. 1 I. 2007

4:54PM
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UWIREMCE (3. WASDEN
Idaho ABomey General
SEPWEN A, BWUAER
Deputy AAttorney General
Chief, Criminaf Law Division
JUSJIN tl. WHATCOTT
Deputy Amrney GeneraI and
Special Prosecuting Attorney
P.0. Box 83720
Boise, Idatto 837204010
Telephone: (208) 332-3096
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

TH€ STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

1

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

j

Case NO. ~ ~ - 0 6 - 3 2 a 6 8

)
)

vs .

NOTICE OF STATE'S JURY
TRIAL WITNESSES AND
EXHIBITS

1

JAMES A. COCHRAN,

1

1

Defendant.

COMES NOW, Justin D. Whatcott,. Deputy Attorney General and Special

Prosecuting Attorney for Idaho County, who hereby gives notice to the Court and counsel
of the State's witnesses and exhibtts, listed below.
STATE'S WITNESSES
1. Cochran, Chrissy
2. Crocker, Doris

3. Dotson, Susan

4. Hewlett, Brenda
5. Hixon, Amanda

6. Lanoue, Renee
NOTICE OF STATE'S JURY TRIAL WI%@$S?
-

t

,

fND EXHIBITS (COCHRAN), Page 1
J

NO. 969

P. 314

7. Mealst, Jason (via dr?position)
8. Meder, S b t t

9. Quintal, Mike
10. Renshaw, Joan
11. Richan, Sarnanrtha

12.Vichy, Lorna
13. Yeager, Mydell

STATE'S EXHIBITS

6
7
8
9
10
11
12

Nightgown cotlected from Amanda Hixon
Register Receipt from Sunset Mart
Electronic Check Receipt from Sunset Mart
Documents from Kamiah Credit Union
Audio of Int. of Amanda Hixon by Jason Mealor
- -Audio of Int. of Amanda Mixon by Skott Mealor
Redacted Audio of Int. of Chrissy Cochran by Joan Renshaw

DATED this 11" day of May, 2007.

~ e ' w t t o r n e General
y

NOWCE OF STATE'S JURY TRIAL WITN~SSE~
+ND EXHIBITS (COCHRAN), Page 2
I I
w

u

&'

MAY. 11. 2007 4: 54PM

ID ATTNY GEN C R I M D I V

CEfWlFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CEFtTIfY that on #is

day of May, 2007,1 caused to be sewed a

true and correct copy of the foregoing Request for Discovery to:
Danny 3. Radakodch
Attorney at:Law
1624 G Street
Lewiston, ID 83501

-U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid
-Wand Delivered
-Overnight Mail
Facsimile

w e a n Newman, Legal Secretary

+

NOTICE OF STATE'S JURY TRIAL-..W\TVWSfSPD EXHIBITS (COCHRAN), Page 3

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,
PlaintifT,

1
1
1

CASE NO. CR-2006-0032068
STIPULATION OF FACT

)
v.

JAMES ALLEN C O C H W ,
Defendant.

1
1

1
1
1

COME NOW the State of Idaho, by and through Justin D. Whatcott, Deputy Attorney
General and Special Prosecuting Attorney for Idaho County, and Defendant James Allen Cochran,
by and through his attorney of record, Danny J. Radakovich, and hereby enter into this stipulation
of fact to be admitted at the jury trial in this matter. Specifically, the parties request tfia-tthe jury be
read the following:

Parties can agree that certain fact are true, thereby eliminating the need for any evidence
to establish those facts. In this case, the State and the defendant have agreed that the following is
true:
(1)

Certain items of evidence in this case were sent to a forensic
laboratory in North Carolina for D.N.A. testing. Specifically, the
following items were tested for the presence of D.N.A.:
a. A fitted sheet seizedfiom the bed in the master bedroom of the
Defendant's home by Detective Mike Quintal of the Idaho County
Sherzfs Department;
b. A blanket seized fiom the bed in the master bedroom of the
Defendant S home by Detective Mike Quintal of the Idaho County

STIPULATION OF FACT

RADAKOVICH JAW OFFICE
1624 G Street,
Lewiston, ID 83501

s'szeriffs Department;
c. A second blanket seizedfiom the bed in the master bedroom ofthe
Defindant's home by lleteetive Mike Quinfal ofthe Idaho County
Sherzfs Department;
d. A cowlforter seizedpom the bed in the master bedroom of the

Defendant's home by Detective Mike Qui~ltatofthe Idaho County
Sherifs Deparbment;
e. A silk nightgown collectedfi.om Amanda Wixon;
(2) The forensic laboratory was also provided with known D.N.A. samples collected from

Amanda Hixon and the Defendant;
(3) The results of the forensic D.N.A. tests and comparisons are as follows:

a. 'I'he fitted sheet was observed to have nwnerous visible stains, four
of which were tested for D.N.A.:
i. Two of the stains tested from the sheet contained a
D.N.A. profile that is consistent with the D.N.A.
profile obtained from James Cochran, and he cannot
be excluded as the source of the genetic material
found. Amanda Hixon is excluded as a contributor to
the genetic material in these samples;
ii. One stain tested from the sheet contained D.N.A.

that is a mixture of D.N.A. profiles from more than
one individual, at least one of which is a male. James
Cochran cannot be excluded as a contributor to the
genetic material in these samples. Amanda Hixon is
excluded as a contributor to the genetic material in
these samples;
iii. One stain tested from the sheet contained a D.N.A.
profile that is consistent with originating from A

STIPULATION OF FACT

RADAKOVICH LAW OFFICE
1624 G Street,
Lewiston, ID 83501

female. Amanda Hixon is excluded as a contributor
to this sample;
iv. At the request of the State, additional stains from
the sheet were not tested;
b. The first blanket contained two visible stains, each of which
cantained a D.N.A. profile that is consistent with the D.N.A. profile
obtained from James Cochran, and he cannot be excluded as the
source of the genetic material found. Amanda Hixon is excluded as
a contributor to the genetic material in these samples;
c. The second blanket contained one visible stain which contained a
mixture of D.N.A. from more than one individual, at least one of
which is a male. James Cochran cannot be excluded as the source of
the genetic material found.

Amanda Hixon is excluded as a

contributor to the genetic material in these samples;
d. The comforter contained two visible stains:

i. The furst stain contained a D.N.A. profile that is
consistent with the D.N.A. profile obtained from
James Cochran, and he cannot be excluded as the
source of the genetic material found. Amanda Hixon
is excluded as a contributor to the genetic material in
these samples;
ii. The second stain contained a D.N.A. profile that is
consistent with originating from a female. Amanda
Hixon is excluded as a contributor to this sample;
e. The nightgown contained two visible stains:
i. The first stain tested negative for the presence of
blood, but contained a D.N.A. profile that is
consistent with the D.N.A. obtained from Amanda

STIPULATION OF FACT

RADAKOVICH LAW OFFICE
1624 G Street,
Lewiston, ID 83501

Hixon. J m e s Cochran is excluded as a source ofthe
genetic material in this sample. The probability of
randomly selecting an unrelated individual with this

D.N.A. profile is approximately 1 in greater than
one in greater than 6.5 billion), or 1 in
greater than the approximate world population;
ii. The second stain tested positive for blood and
contained a D.N.A. profile from a female source
digerent than the first stain. Amanda Hixon is
excluded as the source of the genetic material in this
sample.
You are to accept the agreed-upon facts as being true, and are to consider them along with
all the other evidence admitted during the trial. You should draw no inferences on the identity of
the additional stains, other than what has been set forth herein.

DATED this 17th day of May, 2007.

STIPULATION OF FACT

RADAKOVICH LAW OFFICE
1624 G Street,
Lewiston, ID 83501

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
State of Idaho,
Plaintiff,

)

1

CASE NO. CR 0 6 - 3 2 0 6 8

)

James A. Cochran 11,
Defendant.

1
1
1
1

JURY INSTRUCTION GIVEN BY THE COURT
,
,

JURY INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN BY THE COURT

INSTRUCTION NO. 1
Members of the Jury:
You have now heard all the evidence in the case. My duty is to instruct you as to the

law. You must follow all the rules as I explain them to you even if you disagree or don't
understand the reasons for some of the rules.
The law you are to apply in deciding this case is given to you in these instructions, which
you must follow regardless of your previous ideas or impressions.
You should consider all instructions together as a whole and not put emphasis on some
and disregard others. If in these instructions 1 state any rule of law or other proposition in
varying ways or more than once, I have intended no emphasis and no emphasis should be
inferred by you. The order in which these instructions are given has no significance as to their
relative importance.
You are to decide the issues presented in this case solely from the evidence admitted in
open court and you are to apply to those facts the law given to you in these instructions. In this
way, you decide the case, or, as we say, arrive at or reach a verdict. In deciding the case, you
must follow my instructions regardless of your own opinion of what the law is or should be, or
what either side may state the law to be.
The fact that the Defendant has been charged with an offense and brought before this
Court for trial is not evidence of guilt, and raises no inference of guilt.
In your deliberations, you must not be influenced by pity, sympathy, passion, prejudice,
m o r , or by any previous information that you have heard or read. However, you are not
required to set aside your general observations and experience in the affairs of life, but may
consider evidence in light of such observations and experience.

You are the sole judges of the credibility of any witness, that is, his or her tvorthiness of
belief. In detemining such credibility, you may take into account the witness's memory, ability
and opportunity to observe, manner of testifying, any motive, interest, bias, or prejudice such
witness may have, the character of the witness's testimony and the reasonableness thereof, when
considered in light of all the evidence in the case. You are also the judges of the weight to be
given any evidence.

INSTRUCTION NO. 2
You are being instnxcted as to all the rules of law that may be necessary for you to reach

a verdict. Wether some of the instructions will apply will depend upon your determination of
the facts. You will disregard any instruction that applies to a state of facts that you determine
does not exist.
You will notice that many, but not all, of these instructions that 1 am about to read to you
are identical to those read to you at the beginning of the trial. It is not the intent of the Court to
lay any special emphasis on those instructions. The only reason they are given to you again is so
that all of the instructions concerning this case will be fresh in your minds and of equal
importance when you start your deliberations.

INSTRUCTION NO. 3
If during the trial I said or did anything that suggested to you that I was inclined to favor
the claims or position of any party, you will not permit yourself to be influenced by any such
suggestion. I did not express, nor intend to express, nor did I intend to intimate, any opinion as
to which witnesses were or were not worthy of belief";what facts were or were not established;
or what inferences should be drawn from the evidence. If any expression of mine seemed to
indicate an opinion relating to any of these matters, I instruct you to disregard it.

INSTRUCTION NO. 4
You are the sole judges of what facts have or have not been proven. In determining the
facts, you may consider only the evidence admitted in this trial. This evidence consists of the
sworn testimony of the witnesses, the exhibits admitted into evidence, and any stipulated or
admitted facts. Certain things you have heard or seen are not evidence, including:

I . Arguments and statements by the lawyers. The lawyers are not witnesses. What
they say in their opening statements, closing arguments and at other times are
included to help you interpret the evidence, but are not evidence. If the facts as
you remember them differ from the way the lawyers have stated them, follow
your memory;

2. Testimony that has been excluded or stricken, or which you have been instructed
to disregard;

3. Anything you may have seen or heard when the court was not in session.

The production of evidence in court is governed by rules of law. At times during the
trial, an objection may have been made to a question asked of a witness, or to a witness's answer,
or to an exhibit. This simply meant that I was being asked to decide a particular rule of law.
Arguments on the admissibility of evidence are designed to aid the Court and are not to be
considered by you nor affect your deliberations. If I sustained an objection to a question or to an
exhibit, the witness may not have answered the question or the exhibit may not have been
considered. Do not attempt to guess what the answer might have been or what the exhibit might
have shown. Similarly, if I told you not to consider a particular statement or exhibit, you should
put it out of your mind and not refer to it or rely on it in your later deliberations.

The law does not require you to believe all the evidence. As the sole judges of the facts,
you must detemine what evidence you believe and what weight you attach to it.
There is no magical formula by which one may evaluate testimony. You bring with you
to this courtroom all of the experience and background of your lives. In your everyday affairs
you determine for yourselves whom you believe, what you believe, and how much weight you
attach to what you are told. The same considerations that you use in your everyday dealings in
making these decisions are the considerations that you should apply in your deliberations.
In deciding what you believe, do not make your decision simply because more witnesses
may have testified one way than the other. Your role is to think about the testimony of each
witness you heard and decide how much you believe of what the witness had to say.

NSTRUGTION NO. 5
You are instructed that the State and the Defendant are entitled to the individual opinion
of each juror. It is f i e duty of each of you, after considering all the evidence in the case, to
deternine, if possible, the question of the Defendant's guilt or imocence. When you have
reached a conclusion in that respect, you should not change it merely because one or more or all
of your fellow jurors may have come to a different conclusion, or merely to bring about a
unanimous verdict. However, each juror should freely and fairly discuss with his or her fellow
jurors the evidence and the deductions to be drawn from it. After doing so, if any juror is
satisfied that the conclusion first reached was wrong, that juror should unhesitatingly abandon
the originaI opinion and render a verdict according to the final decision.

NSTRUCTTION NO. 6
In reaching your verdict in this action, you are to be guided and controlled only by the
evidence adduced at this trial 'and the instructions now given to you by the Court. In case any of
you have received information, or what purports to be information, from any other source other
than the facts in this case, you are admonished and instructed to exclude such extraneous
infomation or purported information from a11 consideration. Your verdict should be based
exclusively upon the evidence offered at this trial and should in no way be influenced by any
rumor, feeling, or outside influence coming from any quarter, either before or during this trial.

INSTRUCTION NO. 7
During your deliberations, you will have with you my instructions conceming the law
that applies to this case, the exhibits that were admitted into evidence, and any notes taken by
you in the course of the trial proceedings.

INSTRUCTION NO. 8
A defendant in a criminal trial has a constitutional right not to be compelled to testify.
The decision whether to testifj, is lefc to the defendant, acting with the advice and assistance of
the defendant's lawyer. You must not draw any inference of guilt from the fact that a defendant
does not testify, nor should this fact be discussed by you or enter into your deliberations in any
way.

INSTRUCTION NO. 9
Under our law and system of justice, the Defendant is presumed to be innocent. The
presmption of innocence means two things.
First, the State has the burden of proving the Defendant guilty. The State has that burden
throughout the trial. The Defendant is never required to prove his innocence, nor does the
Defendant ever have to produce any evidence at all.
Second, the State must prove the alleged crime beyond a reasonable doubt. A reasonable
doubt is not a mere possible or imaginary doubt. It is a doubt based on reason and common
sense. It is the kind of doubt that mrould make an ordinary person hesitant to act in the most
important affairs of his or her own life. If after considering all the evidence, you have a
reasonable doubt about the guilt of the Defendant, you must find the Defendant not guilty.

INSTRUCTION NO. 10
You are hereby instructed that the Defendant, JAMES A. GOCETRAN, is charged with

LEWD CONDUCT WITH A M N O R W D E R SIXTEEN YEARS, the charging portion of the
Information reading:
Defendant committed a lewd and lascivious act or acts upon or with the body of a
rnirlor child under the age of sixteen years, to-wit: defendant had manual-genital
contact with a child with initials A.J.H. birth date of 12/28/1992, with the intent of
arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lusts, passions or sexual desire of himself,
or said minor, while at or near Kooskia, Idaho County, State of Idaho. in violation
of I.C. 5 18-1508.

To the charge the Defendant pled "not guilty."

INSTRUCTION NO. 11
An Information is but a formal method of accusing a defendant of a crime. It is not

evidence of any kind against the accused.

INSTRUCTION NO. 12
You will notice that the Infomation charges that the offense was committed "on or
about" a certain date. If the jury finds that the crime charged was committed, it is not necessary
that the proof show that the crime was committed on that precise date. It is sufficient if the proof
shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime charged was committed "on or about" the date
alleged.

INSTRUCTION NO. 13
It is not necessary that every fact and circumstance put in evidence on behalf of the State

be established beyond a reasonable doubt, but it is necessary to sustain a conviction that all facts
and circumstances in evidence, when taken together, establish beyond a reasonable doubt the
material elements of the offense charged.

INSTRUCTION NO. 14
In order for the Defendant to be guilty of LEWD CONDUCT WITH A MINOR UNDER

SIXTEEN YEARS, as charged in the Information, the State must prove each of the following:
1) On or about March 30,2006,
2) in the State of Idaho,

3) the Defe~ldant,JAMES A. COCHRAN, committed an act of manual-genital
contact upon or with the body of A.J.H.
4) A.J.H. was a child under sixteen (16) years of age, and

5) The Defendant committed such act with the specific intent to arouse, appeal to, or
gratify the lust or passions or sexual desires of the Defendant or of such child.

If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find
the Defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you
must find the Defendant guilty.

INSTRUCTION NO. 15
To constitute lewd and lascivious conduct, it is not necessary that bare skin be touched.
The touching may be through the clothing.

INSTRUCTION NO. 16
In these instructions, "sexual contact" means any physical contact between the child and
the actor, or between children which is caused by the actor, or the actor causing the child to have
self contact, any of which is intended to gratify the lust or sexual desire of the actor or some
other person.

INSTRUCTION NO. 17
Tbe law does not require as an essential element of the crime of Lewd Conduct with a
Child LTndcr Sixteen Years that the lust, passions, or sexual desires of either the Defendant or

A.J.H. be actually aroused, appealed to, or gratified.

INSTRUCTION NO. 18
The law permits the jury to find the Defendant guilty of any offense which is necessarily
included in the crime of LEWD CONDUCT WITH A CHILD UNDER SIXTEEN YEARS, as
charged in the Information, whenever such a course is consistent with the facts found by the jury
from the evidence in the case and with the law as given in the instructions of the Court.
If the jury should unanimously find the Defendant not guilty of Lewd Conduct with a
Child, then the jury must determine if the State has proven the Defendant committed the
included offense of SEXUAL ABUSE OF A CHILD. In order to find the Defendant guilty of
the included offense, you must be unanimous in your finding.
The jury must bear in mind that the burden is always on the prosecution to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt every essential element of an offense that is necessarily included in the crime
charged. The law never imposes upon a Defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of
calling any witnesses or producing any evidence.

NSTRUCTION NO. 19
If your unanimous verdict is that the Defendant is not guilty of Lewd Conduct with a
Child Under Sixteen Years, as charged in the Information, you must acquit him of that charge.
In that event, you must next consider the included offense of SEXUAL ABUSE OF A CHILD.

In order for the Defendant to be guilty of SEXUAL ABUSE OF A CHILD, the State
must prove each of the following:
1) On or about March 30,2006,

2) in the State of Idaho,
3) the Defendant, James A. Cochran, caused or had sexual contact with A.J.H. not
amounting to lewd conduct,
4) the Defendant was eighteen (1 8) years of age or older,

5 ) A.J.H. was under sixteen (1 6) years of age, and

6) the Defendant did such act with the specific intent to gratify the lust, passions, or
sexual desire of the Defendant or of such child.

If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must find
the Defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you
must find the Defendant guilty.

INSTRUCTION NO. 20
You are instructed that it is not a defense to the crime of Lewd Conduct with a Minor
Under Sixteen Years or the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child that A.J.H. may have consented to
the alleged conduct.

INSTRUCTION NO. 21
Do not concern yourself with the subject of penalty or punishment. That subject must
not in any way affect your verdict. If you find the Defendant guilty, it will be my duty to
determine the appropriate penalty or punishment.

INSTRUCTION NO. 22
I have outlined for you the rules of law applicable to this case and have told you of some
of the matters which you may consider in weighing the evidence to determine the facts. In a few
minutes counsel will present their closing remarks to you and then you will retire to the jury
room for your deliberations.
The arguments and statements of the attorneys are not evidence. If you remember the
facts differently from the way the attorneys have stated them, you should base your decision on
what you remember.
The attitude and conduct of jurors at the beginning of your deliberations are important. It
is rarefy productive at the outset for you to make an emphatic expression of your opinion on the
case or to state how you intend to vote. When you do that at the beginning, your sense of pride
may be aroused, and you may hesitate to change your position even if shown that it is wrong.
Remember that you are not partisans or advocates, but are judges. For you, as for me, there can

be no triumph except in the ascertainment and declaration of the truth.
As jurors you have a duty to consult with one another and to deliberate before making
your individual decisions. You may fully and fairly discuss among yourselves all of the
evidence you have seen and heard in this courtroom about this case, together with the law that
relates to this case as contained in these instructions.
During your deliberations, each of you has a right to re-examine your own views and
change your opinion. You should only do so if you are convinced by fair and honest discussion
that your original opinion was incorrect based upon the evidence the jury saw and heard during
the trial and the.law as given you in these instructions.
Consult with one another. Consider each other's views, and deliberate with the objective
of reaching an agreement, if you can do so without disturbing your individual judgment. Each

of you must decide this case for yourself, but you should do so only after discussion and
consideration of the case with your fellow jurors.
However, none of you should surrender your honest opinion as to the weight or effect of
evidence or as to the innocence or guilt of the defendant because the majority of the jury feels
otherwise or for the purpose of returning a unanimous verdict.

INSTRUCTION NO. 23
lJpon retiring to the jury room, select one of you as the presiding juror who will direct
your deliberations. It is that person's duty to see that discussion is orderly; that the issues
submitted for your decision are fully and fairly discussed; and that every juror has a chance to
express himself or herself upon each question.
In this case, your verdict must be unanimous. Your verdict cannot be arrived at by
chance, by lot, or by compromise.

If, after considering all of the instructions in their entirety, and after having fully
discussed the evidence before you. the jury determines that it is necessary to communicate with
me, you may send a note by the bailiff. You are not to reveal to me or anyone else how the jury
stands until you have reached a verdict, unless you are otherwise instructed by me to do so.

INSTRUCTION NO. 24
In this case you will return a verdict consisting of a series of questions. Although the
explanations on the verdict form are self-explanatory, they are part of my instructions to you.

The verdict form states:
We, the Jury, duly impaneled and sworn to try the above-entitled action, for our
verdict, unanimously answer the questions submitted to us as follows:

QUESTION NO. 1: Is the Defendant, JAMES A. COCI-IJXAN, not guilty or
guilty of LEWD CONDUCT WITH A CHILD UNDER SIXTEEN YEARS?

Not Guilty

Guilty

If you found the Defendant not ~ u i l t yyou
, should proceed to QUESTION NO. 2.

If you found the Defendant guilty, you should sign and date the verdict form and
notify the bailiff you are done.

QUESTION NO. 2: Is the Defendant, JAMES A. COCHRAN, not guilty or
guilty of SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR?

Not Guilty

Guilty

When all of you arrive at a verdict, the presiding juror will mark the appropriate verdict,
sign and date the verdict form, and inform the bailiff you are done. You will then be returned
into court where your presiding juror will, at my direction, hand the verdict form to the bailiff
who will hand it to me. I will then direct the Clerk to read the verdict aloud and to record the
verdict. Your presiding juror will be asked if this is your verdict and that juror will give your
answer to the court.

INSmUCTION NO. 25
The State will now be given the opportunity to present summation to you. Following
this, the defense will be afforded the opportunity to present summation. Then the State may
present rebuttal argument.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ YERCE

THE S'I'ATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

1
1
1

CASE NO. CR06-32068

)

v.
JAMES A. COCHRAN,
Defendant.

1
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VERDICT FORM

We, the Jury, duly impaneled and sworn to try the above-entitled action, for our verdict,
unanimously answer the questions submitted to us as follows:

QUESTION NO. 1: Is the Defendant, JAMES A. COCFIRAN, not guilty or guilty of
LEWD CONDUCT WITH A CHILD UNDER SIXTEEN YEARS?

Not Guilty

Guilty

If you found the Defendant not guilty, you should proceed to QUESTION NO. 2. If you
found the Defendant guilty, you should sign and date the verdict form and notify the bailiff you
are done.

QUESTION NO. 2: Is the Defendant, JAMES A. C O C H U N , not guilty or guilty of
SEXUAL ABUSE OF A MINOR?
Not Guilty

Guilty

You should now sign and date the verdict form and notify the Bailiff you are done.

Dated this

Presiding Juror

day of May 2007

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
ldaho Attorney General

,UAWO COUNTY DISTRICT C%URT

. +-* FILED

STEPHEN A. BYWATER
Chief, Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
,/'I

JUSTIN D. WHATCOTT ISB #6444
Deputy Attorney General
Special Prosecuting Attorney
P.O. Box 83'720
Boise, ldaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 332-3096
Facsimile: (208) 334-2942

./'

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
THE STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
VS.
JAMES ALLEN COCHRAN
Defendant.

Case No. CR06-32068
SENTENCING MEMORANDUM

COMES NOW, Justin D. Whatcott, Deputy Attorney General and Special
Prosecuting Attorney for ldaho County, who hereby submits this sentencing
memorandum with regard to the sentencing in the above-entitled matter. Oral
argument will be presented by the State at sentencing.
FACTS
The details of this case are more fully described in detail in the PreSentence Report and the reports and attachments contained therein. Additionally,
the State respecifully requests that the Court take Judicial Notice of the evidence
and testimony presented at the jury trial in this matter from May 1 9 through the

I s'h.
On March 30'") 2006, thirteen year old Amanda Joy Hixon spent the night at
the home of her best friend, thirteen year old Elizabeth "Chrissy" Cochran, in

4,
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Kooskia, Idaho. Both girls were on spring break at the time. Also at the house
during this time period was Chrissy's mother, Doris Crocker-Wilson, and DorisJ
live-in boyfriend, James Cochran, the Defendant in this case. The Defendant had
recently adopted thirteen year old Chrissy, but was not married to Doris.
On that evening, the Defendant took Chrissy and Amanda to the Sunset
Mart in Kooskia, and purchased a six pack of "Mike's Cranberry LemonadeJ'and a
four pack of "Seagram's Berry Wine Coolers." After making this purchase, the
Defendant drove Chrissy and Amanda around the area in his vehicle while they
drank the alcohol he had purchased for them. During the ride, he spoke with them
about sex, talked about how he had not had sex for a long time, told Amanda that
she could have "oral sex" without getting pregnant, and indicated that in his religion
(The Pagan Religion), a person can have sex at any age if they feel emotionally
ready.
Later that evening after returning home, both Amanda Hixon and Chrissy
Cochran got into bed to sleep with the Defendant. Chrissy immediately fell asleep
due to the effects of the alcohol, and Amanda was forced to sleep in the middle
between Chrissy and the Defendant. At some point during the night, the
Defendant touched Amanda Hixon in a sexual and inappropriate manner on her
body under her clothes.
Approximately four weeks later, Amanda Hixon disclosed to a friend, and
later to her mother, that the Defendant had touched her. This information was
given to members of the ldaho County Sheriff's Office, who subsequently
interviewed Amanda. After this interview, James Cochran was arrested on the
charge of Lewd Conduct with a Minor. Later that day, Chrissy was interviewed by
ldaho County Sheriff's Deputy Joan Renshaw at her school. Chrissy told Renshaw
that she was unaware that the Defendant had touched Amanda because she was
"passed out." Additionally, Chrissy indicated that the Defendant had touched her
twice prior to the night that he touched Amanda. The first time was in February of
2006 when the Defendant fondled her breasts under her bra, and the second time
was on March 2gthJ2006 when he touched ChrissyJsvaginal area with his hand.
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The Defendant was charged with two counts of Lewd Conduct with a Minor
and one count of Sexual Abuse of a Minor and was released on $30,000.00 bail.
At the preliminary hearing on May 5'" 2006, Amanda Hixon testified to the actions
of the Defendant on March 3oth,and he was bound over on one count of Lewd
Conduct with a Minor. Chrissy Cochran testified that the Defendant has never
touched her, and thus the other two counts were dismissed. The Defendant was
tried on one count of Lewd Conduct with a Minor on May 15thJ2007, and was
convicted of the lesser-included offense of Sexual Abuse of a Minor on May 18thJ
2007.
DEFENDANT'S PRIOR ACTS
In addition to the criminal acts for which he has been convicted in the
instant case, the Defendant has faced 7 prior allegations of sexual misconduct
since 1991. The most recent of these allegations were made by his adopted
daughter, Chrissy Cochran, in April of 2006. As noted above, Chrissy told
Detective Joan Renshaw that the Defendant had fondled her breasts in February
of 2006 and had touched her vagina in March of 2006. After Chrissy was
questioned, her mother Doris indicated that she did not want Chrissy questioned
further by law enforcement. Due to this lack of cooperation regarding her daughter
as a sexual abuse victim, Chrissy was placed in emergency foster care. She was
later returned to her mother's case and almost immediately recanted her
allegations against the Defendant and indicated to law enforcement personnel that
she would not testify that the Defendant had touched her. At the preliminary
hearing, she simply indicated that he had never touched her inappropriately and
no further inquiry was made.
At trial, the Defendant offered the argument that Chrissy was pressured into
making false allegations by Joan Renshaw, indicating that Renshaw had
threatened Chrissy prior to interviewing her. The State intends to present the
audio recording of this interview at the sente~cingto give the Court the opportunity
to review the content and context of the interview to determine whether Chrissy
appears to have been pressured or threatened into making any statements. The
State submits that the evidence adduced at trial, as well as the circumstances
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surrounding ChrissyJsrecantation, support the position that the Defendant and
Chrissy's smother are responsible for the pressure on Chrissy to make a false
statement at the preliminary hearing. The Defendant had sufficient time prior to
the preliminary hearing to place pressure on Chrissy, both directly and indirectly
through her mother and other family members and friends. Additionally, Chrissy's
mother, Doris Crocker-Wilson, stated to Skott Mealer that she had to "stay neutral
in this thing," and that she had previously told Chrissy that "if Jamie goes to jail,
we'll lose the house and four-wheelers." The influence of the Defendant and
Chrissy's mother put sufficient pressure on a thirteen year old girl that she finally
recanted the allegations against him.
On October 3omJ1999, the Defendant was accused by a co-worker in
Worcester, Massachusetts of forcibly penetrating her vagina with his finger and
forcing her to perform oral sex on him. The Defendant was charged with two
counts of Rape for these actions, and denied that he had committed the offense.
The Defendant claimed that the victim fabricated these allegations because she
was late for work and because she had propositioned him sexually and he had
declined her advances. The charges were eventually dismissed for unknown
reasons.
In August of 1994, the Defendant was discharged from the Army for the
offense of "Indecent Acts upon a Child." The allegations leading to his "less than
honorable dischargeJJwere that he touched the vaginal area of a five and a half
year old female child. The Defendant claimed that he had simply put his hand in
the child's diaper to check to see whether she needed to be changed. Army
personnel found the allegations to be credible based upon the actions of the
victim, her physical examination, and the statements of the Defendant. In the presentence report, the Defendant claims that these allegations were dropped, and
that he was discharged for striking a superior officer. The Army's detailed records
regarding the lndecent Acts with a Child investigation reveal that the touching of
the child was the basis for his discharge, and nowhere in any Army reports does it
indicate that he was disciplined for striking an officer.
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In July of 1991, the Defendant was alleged to have forced the wife of an
Army enlistee to have oral sex with him in exchange for him not revealing her affair
with another Army Sergeant. The woman alleged that she was forced to perform
oral sex on the Defendant and that he fondled her vagina while she performed that
act. The Defendant denied that this occurred, but was caught in several
inconsistencies in his story. He was eventually found not guilty in a court martial
proceeding.
In analyzing the relevance of these prior acts, the State concedes that the
Defendant has not been criminally convicted of these 7 allegations. However,
these allegations are very relevant to the issue of the Defendant's character and
whether he is an appropriate candidate for probation. The State submits that the
Defendant has a history of sexual misconduct and inappropriate actions with
females as evidenced by the following:
1. The Defendant was alleged to have committed sexual misconduct twice
---- - -*
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honorable discharge." The Defendant denies these two accusations and
claims he was wrongfully accused.
2. The Defendant was alleged to have committed a forcible sexual act upon a

co-worker, and claimed that she fabricated these allegations due to him
scolding her for being late and rejecting her sexual advances.
3. The evidence at trial established that the Defendant has previously had very

close relationships with young teenage girls. This was evidenced by the
testimony of Amanda Hixon, Brianna Broncheau, and Amber Chamberlain
indicating that each of these young teenage girls called the Defendant
"Dad" or "UncleJ1
despite the fact that he was not biologically related to any
of them.
4. The Defendant's adopted daughter Chrissy alleged that he touched her

inappropriately on two occasions. Although she later recanted this
allegation after being exposed to the Defendant and other family members,
she had no motivation to fabricate this allegation at the time it was made.
Additionally, her allegation regarding his actions of touching her vagina on
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March 29%)2006 are substantially identical to the actions alleged by
Amanda Hixon to have occurred on March 3othJ2006. The Defendant
claims that it was Joan Renshaw who pressured Chrissy into making a false
statement, and that her recantation was the result of getting away from this
pressure.
5. The Defendant was found guilty by a jury of his peers of committing the
crime of Sexual Abuse of a Minor against Amanda Hixon. The Defendant
denies that this occurred and claims that Amanda Hixon is fabricating these
allegations for unknown reasons.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Pursuant to ldaho Code $18-1506, the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Child
Under the Age of Sixteen Years carries a maximum penalty of imprisonment in the
state prison for a period not to exceed twenty-five (25) years. Because no specific
fine amount is indicated, the Defendant can be fined up to fifty thousand dollars
($50,000.00) pursuant to ldaho Code 518-112. Furthermore, the Defendant can
be order to pay restitution for any economic loss suffered by the victim pursuant to
ldaho Code 519-5304. Additionally, ldaho Code 519-5307 provides that the Court
may impose a fine not to exceed $5,000.00 against the Defendant, which shall
operate as a civil judgment against the defendant, entered on behalf of the named
victim. Also, ldaho Code 519-5506 mandates that the Defendant provide to the
ldaho State Police a DNA sample and a right thumbprint impression. Finally,
ldaho Code $18-8301, et. seq., require that the Defendant register as a sex
offender upon release from incarceration.
Under ldaho law, criminal sentencing is a two-part process.

See State v.

Reber, 138 ldaho 275,278, 61 P.3d 632 (Ct.App.2002). The sentencing court is
first required to determine whether the defendant should be incarcerated or placed
on probation under the criteria set forth in ldaho Code 519-2521. The decision
regarding whether imprisonment or probation is appropriate is within the trial
court's discretion. See Id. If the trial court determines that imprisonment is
appropriate, then the trial court must determine the length of the sentence. See Id.
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ldaho Code 519-2521(1) provides that a sentencing court should deal with
a defendant without imposing imprisonment unless, "having regard to the nature
and circumstances of the crime and the history, character, and condition of the
defendant," the court believes imprisonment is required for the protection of the
public due to any one of the following factors:
(a) There is undue risk that during the period of a suspended sentence or
probation the defendant will commit another crime; or
(b) The defendant is in need of correctional treatment that can be provided
most effectively by his commitment to an institution; or
(c) A lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the defendant's crime;
0r
(d) Imprisonment will provide appropriate punishment and deterrent to the
defendant; or
(e) Imprisonment will provide an appropriate deterrent for other persons in the
community; or
(f) The defendant is a multiple offender or professional criminal.
Further, ldaho Code $19-2521(2) lists grounds which shall be accorded weight in
favor of avoiding a sentence of imprisonment.
Additionally, the ldaho Supreme Court has listed four objectives of criminal
punishment: (1) protection of society, (2) deterrence of the individual and public
generally, (3) possibility of rehabilitation, and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing.

See State v. Wolfe, 99 ldaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978))

State v. Moore, 78 ldaho 359, 363, 304 P.2d 1101, 1103 (1956). The Court of
Appeals of ldaho has stated that a term of confinement is reasonable if it is
necessary to accomplish these objectives.

See State v. Toohill, 103 ldaho 565,

568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct.App.1982)
1. The Defendant James A. Cochran i s not an appropriate candidate for

probation, and therefore should be sentenced to imprisonment.
Under the criteria listed in ldaho Code $19-2521(1), the Defendant James A.
Cochran is not an appropriate candidate for probation, and thus imprisonment is
required in this case. Due to the Defendant's criminal actions in this case, as well
as his history of allegations of sexual misconduct, there exists an undue risk that, if
placed upon probation, he would commit another sexual crime. Additionally,
because of his actions in this case and his history of sexual misconduct, the
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Defendant is in need of correctional treatment in the form of a structured
environment which prevents him from having access to young females. By his
conviction in this case, the Defendant has become a convicted sex offender and
certainly his history this status. As the Court in Toohill stated, the primary
consideration in sentencing is the good order and protection of society.

See 103

ldaho at 568. In this case, the protection of society mandates that the public be
protected from the Defendant's sexual acts and that he be incarcerated until he is
no longer a threat to society.
Furthermore, a sentence of probation would depreciate the seriousness of the
Defendant's actions, which require a term of imprisonment for punishment and
both specific and general deterrence. The jury found the Defendant guilty of
touching a thirteen year old girl in an inappropriate and sexual manner.
Additionally, the uncontested evidence at trial established that the Defendant gave
the victim and his thirteen year old adopted daughter alcohol and spoke to them
about sex before having them sleep in his bed. These facts indicate that the
Defendant's actions that night were deliberate and planned. There is no evidence
that the Defendant was under the influence of alcohol or any type of controlled
substance, or that he was an unwilling participant in these actions. Additionally,
the victim was a person who was close with him, trusted him, and called him
"Dad." The Defendant committed a violation of trust by taking advantage of a
young girl that he got intoxicated in order to have the opportunity to feed his sexual
deviance. As such, these egregious actions on the part of the Defendant warrant
punishment.
Additionally, because the Defendant committed a sexual act with a thirteen
year old girl, the sentence in this case must be one which will deter the Defendant
and the public in general from committing such an act. Certainly the State has an
interest in protecting children from sexual predators and individuals who would
commit the type of acts that James Cochran has been found guilty of committing.
Due to the prevalence of high-profile child sexual abuse cases in recent years, the
importance and effect of deterrence in sentencing has become paramount. This is
reflected by the fact that in 2006, the ldaho Legislature amended Idaho Code $18-
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1506 to increase the maximum penalty from fifteen (15) years to twenty-five (25)
years. A sentence that does not impose imprisonment would depreciate the
Defendant's conduct and eliminate the effect of deterrence contemplated by the
ldaho Legislature and ldaho Courts. The sentence in this case should send the
message to the Defendant and the public in general that individuals who commit
sexual acts with young children will be severely punished with imprisonment.
Further, the Defendant is not an appropriate candidate for probation due to his
history of sexual offenses. Although this is his first criminal conviction, the
allegations of "Indecent Liberties with a Child in 1994 were deemed credible by
the Army and led to a "Less than Honorable" discharge of the Defendant from the
Army. Additionally, the allegations made by his adopted daughter Chrissy were
recanted only after she was influenced by the Defendant and her mother. The
Court can listen to that audio tape at the sentencing hearing and determine
whether the allegations seem credible or not. It is also noteworthy that in each
allegation of sexual misconduct (including the instant offense), the Defendant
claims that he was wrongfully accused and lays blame on the victim, yet admits to
circumstances that place him in a situation where he had the opportunity to commit
the offense with no other witnesses present (e.g. admitting to purchasing alcohol
for Amanda Hixon and Chrissy Cochran and having them in his bed, admitting to
giving the alleged rape victim in 1991 in Massachusetts a "back rub," admitting to
"checking the diaper" of the alleged victim in 1994, and admitting to being alone
with the alleged victim in 1991 and possibly leaving a pubic hair in his patrol
vehicle). These circumstances lead to the conclusion that either the Defendant is
the most unlucky person in the world with numerous people "out to get him," or he
has repeatedly committed sexual offenses without being held accountable or
having been punished.
ldaho Code $19-2521(2) lists the criteria that may be considered as grounds in
favor of avoiding a sentence of imprisonment. These mitigating factors weigh
against the Defendant in this case as follows:
(a) The Defendant's criminal conduct caused harm to Amanda Hixon and her
family;
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(b) The Defendant knew andlor should have known that his conduct would
cause harm to Amanda Hixon;
(c) The Defendant acted under no provocation;
(d) Nothing established in the evidence in this case excuses or justifies the
Defendants actions in any way;
(e) The victim did nothing to induce or facilitate the commission of the crime;
(f) The Defendant cannot compensate the victim for the emotional harm that
he has caused her, and that emotional harm will likely effect her for her
entire life;
(g) The Defendant has a history of prior sexual misconduct, as detailed above;
(h) The Defendant's conduct was the result of circumstances that are likely to
recur due to the fact that he has numerous close relationships with young
teenage girls;
(i) The character and attitude of the Defendant in denying that this act ever
occurred indicates that the commission of another crime is

m.

Under the criteria in ldaho Code $19-2521(1) and (2), the Court should deal with
this Defendant, for committing this crime, by imposing a sentence of imprisonment.
Finally, the State submits that the Defendant is not an appropriate candidate
for probation due to his actions during the course of the proceedings in this case.
The Defendant has made numerous attempts to manipulate potential witnesses in
this case, and has repeatedly disparaged and harassed State's witnesses.
Examples of the Defendant's manipulation can be found in the testimony of
Chrissy Cochran, Brianna Broncheau, and Amber Chamberlain, as well as the
statements of Saundra Barrett and Fred Hendren. Furthermore, the Defendant
prior to trial complained to school officials in Kooskia that Amanda Hixon should
not be attending school in Kooskia because she commonly stayed at her
grandmother's house in Kamiah, and because he would not be able to go to the
school due to the no-contact order. These actions of the Defendant, as well as the
frequent harassment by the Defendant's adopted daughter and her friends,
caused the victim in this case to move out of state. Additionally, the Defendant
has made numerous public accusations of impropriety against ldaho County
Sheriff's Detectives Skott Mealer and Joan Renshaw, and has actually filed a
"Notice of Tort Claim" against them.
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2. The Court should impose a term of imprisonment that effectuates the
goals of ( I ) protection of society, (2) deterrence, (3) rehabilitation, and
14) punishment.

The ldaho Court of Appeals has stated that the goal of protection of society is
the primary consideration in sentencing as a matter of policy. See Toohill, 103
ldaho at 568, citing Moore, 78 ldaho at 363. As detailed above, the protection of
society in this case requires that the Defendant be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment for his crime. Furthermore, a sentence of imprisonment will
effectuate the goal of deterrence, both for this specific Defendant and for society in
general. Because of the nature of the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Minor, and the
desire to protect children from sexual predators, deterrence is an important
consideration for the Court in fashioning a sentence in this case. The term of
imprisonment should reflect the seriousness of the Defendant's actions and
discourage him and others from sexually abusing children.
In addition, the goals of punishment and rehabilitation are very important
considerations for a Court that is fashioning a sentence for a Defendant convicted
of a sex offense against a child. Certainly this type of deviant act warrants a
significant punishment as retribution for a crime that our society deems to be one
of the most despicable and deviant acts a person can commit. Additionally,
because it is commonly recognized that individuals who commit sexual acts
against children need sex offender treatment, the question of whether a defendant
can be rehabilitated, and how he can be rehabilitated is important in determining
an appropriate sentence.
In the present case, the Defendant refuses to acknowledge that he committed
this act, just as he has denied that he committed any of the previous allegations
against him. It is clear from the Defendant's attitude regarding the factual
allegations upon which he was convicted, as well as his history of sexual
misconduct, that without some type of treatment or rehabilitation, he is likely to
face such "allegations" again in the future. The ldaho Court of Appeals has
repeatedly stated that it is appropriate for a Court to consider a defendant's refusal
to admit guilt in child sex cases as a factor in sentencing as it relates to the
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possibility of rehabilitation.

State v. Drennon, 126 Idaho 346, 355, 883 P.2d

704, 713 (Ct.App.1994) (defendant's minimization of his culpability with respect to
the commission of a lewd and lascivious act with his young daughter, following a
jury conviction for the same, was a proper sentencing consideration); State v.
Lawrence, 112 Idaho 149, 157-58, 730 P.2d 1069, 1077-78 (Ct.App.1986)
(defendant's refusal to admit guilt following a jury conviction for lewd and lascivious
conduct with minors is a relevant sentencing consideration insofar as rehabilitation
is concerned).
Additionally, "many courts have held that an acknowledgement of guilt is a
critical first step toward rehabilitation."

4.at 157, citing United States v. Hull, 792

F.2d 941 (9th Cir.1986); United States v. Floyd, 496 F.2d 982 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 1069, 95 S.Ct. 654, 42 L.Ed.2d 664 (1974); Goilaher v. United
States, 419 F.2d 520 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 960, 90 S.Ct. 434, 24
L.Ed.2d 424 (1969). Because the Defendant refuses to acknowledge that he did
anything wrong other than purchase alcohol for two thirteen year old girls (he
claims he did this after they "repeatedly" asked him to), he cannot make this first
step towards rehabilitation. Only in a structured environment with extensive
treatment will the Defendant finally be able to take accountability and responsibility
for his actions, and admit his wrongdoing. Absent placement in a structured
environment with treatment, the Defendant will not be able to effectuate
rehabilitation such that he will no longer be a threat to society.
The State submits that the four goals of sentencing analyzed above will be
adequately addressed, with specific emphasis on protection of society, by a
sentence of Fifteen (15) years incarceration, with Five (5) years fixed and Ten
(10) years indeterminate. Such a sentence will ensure that society is protected

from the Defendant until such time that the Department of Corrections can
evaluate him, subject him to rehabilitative treatment, and then determine whether
he is no longer a threat to society such that he can be placed on parole.
Additionally, a period of fifteen years is a sufficient length of imprisonment such
that the goals of punishment and deterrence for this Defendant, as well as
deterrence to society in general, will be met. Finally, the existence of a ten year
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"tail," or indeterminate time, on the sentence will allow the Defendant the
opportunity for parole after a relatively short period of imprisonment, while also
providing for an extended period of supervision.
The State further requests that the Court additionally sentence the Defendant
to a fine in an amount reflecting the seriousness of the offense, and to order the
requirements of immediate fingerprinting, an immediate DNA sample, and

registration on the Sexual Offender Registry, as provided by statute. Finally,
the victim is not requesting a specific amount of restitution due to the fact that she
has not yet attended counseling for the Defendant's actions, but her parents have
indicated that they wish to obtain counseling for her. As such, the State
respectfuily requests this Court enter an order under ldaho Code 319-5307 that

the Defendant is fined the amount of $5,000.00, and that such fine shall
operate as a civil judgment in the name sf Amanda Hixon. The State
specifically requests that the order specify that the Defendant is to pay that fine to
Amanda Hixon.

CONCLUSION
The Defendant has been found guilty by an ldaho County Jury of
committing the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Minor Under 16 Years of Age for
sexually touching Amanda Hixon. Additionally, the Defendant has a history of
being accused of sexual misconduct dating back to 1991. Under the criteria listed
in ldaho Code $19-2521, the Defendant is not an appropriate candidate for
probation, and thus should be sentenced to a period of incarceration in the State
penitentiary. The period of imprisonment should reflect the seriousness of his
crime and accomplish the goals of protection of society, deterrence, punishment,
and rehabilitation. Therefore, the State respectfully requests the Court impose the
following sentence:
1) A period of incarceration in the State penitentiary of Fifteen (15) Years, with
Five (5) Years determinate and Ten (10) Years indeterminate
2) A Fine in the amount of Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00), with Five
Thousand Dollars ($5,000.00) suspended.
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3) That the Defendant be required to provide the ldaho State Police with a
fingerprint sample pursuant to ldaho Code $18-8306(1) and a DNA sample
pursuant to ldaho Code $19-5506 immediately upon his incarceration.
4) That the Defendant be required to register pursuant to the Sexual Offender
Registration Act, ldaho Code $18-8306, et. seq.

5) That the Defendant be fined an amount of Five Thousand Dollars
($5,000.00), and that the fine be payable to Amanda Hixon, and that the
fine shall serve as a civil judgment against the Defendant entered on the
behalf of Amanda Hixon.

DATED this @day of August, 2007.

u

eputy ttorney General

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this @ day of August 2007, 1 caused to be

served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Sentencing Memorandum to:
Danny J. Radakovich
1624 G. Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
F a (208) 746-4672

X U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid
-

-Hand Delivered
-Overnight Mail
-Facsimile

#osean Newman, Legal Secretary
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Danny J. Radakovicli
Radakovich Law Office
Attorney for Defendant
1624 G Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 746-8 162
Idaho State Bar #I 991

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

1
1

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. CR 2006-32068

1

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF POST
TRIAL MOTIONS

1
1

v.

1
JAMES A. COCHRAN,
Defendant.

)

1
1

THE DEFENDANT has filed two post-trial motions in this niatter. One is a motion for a
new trial and the other is a renewal of his previously made motion for ajudgement of acquittal. The
purpose of this brief is to set forth the position of the defendant on those motions. Counsel for the
defendant has only just, on August 24, 2007, received the partial transcript which is necessary to
prosecute the motion for new trial and there will be reference to that transcript in this brief.
The motion for a new trial is based upon Rule 34, I.R.C.P., and upon Idaho Code 5 19-2406.
The grounds for new trial are generally set forth in the statutory section and the ones which
B R E F IN SUPPORT OF POST
TRlAL MOTIONS

1

KADAKOVICH 1,A\%' OFFICE
1624 G Street,
Lewiston, ID 83501

may apply in this case are:
"5. When the court has misdirected the jury in a matter of law, or has erred
in the decision of any question of law arising during the court of a trial.
6. When the verdict is contrary to the law or the evidence."
A motion for a judgement of acquittal 1s governed by Rule 20, I.R.C.P., and si~o~ild
be

granted if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction on the offense charged in the
indictment, information, or complaint. The rule goes on the say that, if a motion for a verdict of
acquittal is made and the court reserves ruling on the motion and submits the matter to the jury, then
the court may grant the motion even after the jury returns a verdict of guilty.
As the court is aware, the defendant was actually charged with the offense of lewd conduct
with a minor under the age of sixteen, in violation of Idaho Code tj 18- 1508. That statute provides,
in relevant part, as follo\vs:
"Any person who shall commit and lewd of lascivious act or acts upon or
with the body or any part or member thereof of a minor child under the age of sixteen
(16) years, including but not limited to, genital-genital contract, oral-genital contact,
anal-genital contact, oral-anal contact, manual anal contact, or manual-genital
contact, whether between persons of the same or opposite sex, . . . when any of such
acts are done with the intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust of
passions or sexual desires of such person, such minor child, or third parties, shall be
guilty of a felony. . ."
The court elected, on its own initiative, to instruct the jury not only on the charge of lewd conduct,
but also on the potentially lesser included offense of sexual abuse of a child under the age of sixteen
(1 6) years. That offense is set forth in Idaho Code $18-1506, which provides, in relevant part, as
follows:
"(1) It is a felony for any person eighteen (18) years of age or older, with the
intent to gatify the lust, passions, or sexual desire of the actor, minor child or third
party, to:
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(b) cause of have sexual contact with such minor child not
amounting to lewd conduct as defined in section 18-1508, ldaho
Code:

(3) For the purposes of this section "sexual contact" means any physical
contact between such minor child and any person, which is caused by the actor, or
the actor causing such minor child to have self contact."
The defendant was found not guilty of the charge of lewd conduct but found guilty of the charge of
sexual abuse, which is problematic, based on the evidence in this case. We have the following
arguments.

1. INSTRUCTING ON SEXUAL ABUSE WAS ERROR.
A. THE ACTS CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION DID NOT
SUPPORT AN INSTRUCTION ON SEXUAL ABUSE.
As noted above, the instruction on the lesser included offense of sexual abuse was given on
the court's initiative and not at the request of the defendant. While it is true that sexual abuse g a ~
be a lesser included offense of lewd conduct, that may not necessarily be so in every case. State v.

Drennon. 126 Idaho 346,353,883 P.2d 704 (Ct. .4pp., 1994) It

I S the

facts alleged whlch dete~I ~ I I I C

the propriety of illstructing on sexual abuse as a lesser included offense. State v. O'Neill, 1 18 ldaho
244, 249, 796 P.2d 12 1 (1990)
In this particular case, it is clear that the information filed against the defendant only alleged
manual-genital contact between the defendant and Amanda Wixon. Therefore, the only relevant
evidence in the case was evidence of manual-genital contact and the vast majorit\/ o f the t e s t ~ ~ i ~ o ~ i \
of Amanda Wixon dealt with that in great detail. There was a brief portion of Amanda HIXOII'S
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testimony relative to touching upon the breast (Tr. P. 29, 11. 6-1 8) but the State never made any
motion to anend the information to contain those iBctu;il allegations and, therefore, any testimony
as to the touching of the breast was mere surplusage, as the charge sat at the time of trial.
It is very clear from the face of Idaho Code $18-1 508 that the alleged manual-genital
touching, as alleged in the information, if proven, would amount to lewd conduct. The decision in
Drennon, supra, is quite clear on the point that, when the evidence shows orrly lewd conduct, it is
not appropriate to instruct on the lesser ~ncludedoffense of sexual abuse Thus, the test1111o11\'tt tlic
trial should have been limited to manual-genital contact and there should have been no ~nstr-uct~on
on the lesser included offense of sexual abuse on a minor. For that reason, the defendant is entitled
to a new trial.
B. GIVING AN INSTRUCTION ON THE 1,ESSER INCLUDED
OFFENSE OF SEXUAL ABUSE, IN THE ABSENCE OF '4 REQUEST FOR
SAID INSTRUCTION BY EITHER PARTY, \$/AS INCORRECT.
A second aspect as to the propriety ofthe court g~vingthe lesser ~ncludecloffense ~ n s t r u c t ~ o ~ ~
on the charge of sexual abuse resolves around Idaho Code 9 19-2 132,the statute governing the giving
ofjury instructions in criminal cases. That statutory section provides, in relevant part, as follo\vs:
"(b) The court shall instruct the jury with respect to a lesser included offense
if:
(1) Either party requests such an instruction;

a

(2) There is a reasonable view of the evidence presented in the case that
would support a finding that the defendant committed such lesser included offense
but did not commit the greater offense." (Emphasis ours)
This version of the statute in question, which was the version in effect at the time of this trial,
incorporates a change in the law requiring that the lesser included offense instruction be given only
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF POST
TRIAL MOTIONS

4

R:IDAKC)VICEI LAW OFFICE
1624 G Street,
I,ewiston, ID 83501

if requested by either party. In other words, after this amendment, it would no longer bo proper for
the court to givc such an instruction suu sponte.
It is true that, prior to 1988, there were numerous cases which discrrssctl this issue,
emphasizing that it was the trial court's duty to give instructio~~s
on lesser included o f i l ~ s e s As

15

noted in thc Drenaon, supra, case in footnote 1 on page 352 of the decision, however, the
amendment to Idaho Code $19-2 132 effectively changed all of that and placed the affirmative duty
on the parties to request the lesser included offense instruction.
Given that neither party appears to have requested the instruction on the lesser included
offense of sexual abuse of a minor, it was incorrect under Idalio Code 8 19-2 132 to

give

SLICII an

instruction and the defendant should receive a new trial on that ground as well.

2. THE INSTRUCTIONS GIVEN DID NOT SUFFICIENTLY DISTINGUISH LEWD
CONDUCT AND SEXUAL ABUSE.

A further point to consider is that the instructions given really did not distinguish between
the charge of lewd conduct and the lesser included offense of sexual abuse in any meaningful and
intelligible fashion. The problem lies with the fashion in which the legislature chose to draft these
two (2) statutory section, i.e., Idaho Code $318-1506 and 18- 1508. That fact is recognized in the

Drennon, supra, case wherein the court noted at page 354 thereof as follows:
"Unfortunately, I.C. $18- 1506 and $18- 1508 are poorly written and appear
to prohibit overlapping kinds of conduct. Sexual conduct that amounts to sexual
abuse can conceivably fall into the nebulous category of acts which, under I.C. $181508, included but are not limited to the enumerated acts of lewd conduct."
Tlie difficulty with the situation in this case lies in the fact that the defendant was acquitted of the
greater charge but convicted of the lesser charge. Had he been convicted of the greater charge, there

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF POST
TMAL MOTIONS

5

RADAKOVICH LAW OFFICE
1624 G Street,
Lewiston, ID 83501

can't hc too much doubt that the jury was properly tnstsucteci or1 the elerr~entsof the of fensc

\,$'I tli

respect to the lesser charge of sexual abuse, the only definition given to the jury, which admittedly
mirrors the statute, is that the defendant engaged in sexual contact not amount to lewd conduct.
Thus, the jury really had no definition of what that might be and the defendant certainly should have
been entitled to have them know more than they were told. Thc key to the problem rnay well be that
Idaho Code 618-1506 of unconstitutionally vague
In the absence of some better definition of "sexual abuse", the defendant should have a new
trial on that charge.
3.

THE VAIRLANCE IN EVIDENCE FROM WHAT WAS CHARGE IN THE
INFORMATION REOUIRES A NEW TRIAL.

In the case before the court, as noted above, the information brought against the defendant
in this case charges only the crime of lewd conduct based on manual-genital contact between the
defendant and the alleged victim. During the trial, however, the prosecution went beyond the
information and adduced testimony as to other types of conduct, to which the alleged victim
indicated that her breast had been touched. Perhaps this is the basis for the jury's conviction on the
charge of sexual abuse. There is no way to know. It is clear in the law that, since manual-genital
contact purely falls within the definition of lewd conduct, the finding of "not guilty" on the lewd
conduct charge amounts to a finding by the jury that manual-genital contact did not occur. That
leaves only the alleged touching of the breast. The law would seem to say that, since the evidence
of the alleged touching of the breast was different that the actions charged in the information, the
State may only properly proceed on that evidence if it is a "mere variance" from the language o f the
information.
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The case of State v. Colwell, 124 Idaho 560,565,861 P.2d 1225 (Ct. App., 1993) notes thc
following:
""Generally, a variance behveen the facts alleged in the pleading instrument
and the proof at trial will not be deemed fatal unless there has been such a variance
as to 'affect the substantial rights of the accused.' (Citations omitted) a 'mere
variance' between t11e facts alleged in the infonnation and those proved at trial
requires reversal of the convictiort only when an examination of the record indicates
that the defendant was deprive of a right to fair notice or is left open to the risk of
double jeopardy.
However, there is a marked difference between a 'mere variance' and a
variance which is automatically fatal because it amounts to an impermissible
konstructive amendment'. (Citations omitted) Although the rules for amertdlng an
information in this state arc liberal, see I.C. jj 19-1420, any amendment which charges
the accused with a crime of greater degree or u dffererzt nature than that for which
the accused was bound over for trial by the committing magistrate is barred by the
Idaho Constitution. (Citations omitted) Where a variance alters the Information to the
extent that an amendment of the same scope would be prohibited, the failure to hold
the variance fatal would necessarily undermine these statutory and constitutional
limitations placed on amendments.
In this case, we conclude that the district court's instructions went beyond
creating a "mere variance" between the conduct alleged in the Information and the
conduct proved at trial; it amounted to a constructive amendment of the lnfonrratlon
to charge Colwell with additional crimes that were separate and distrnct ti-om the
crime explicitly alleged. Such an amelldment clearly is barred by this state's
constitution, and constitutes reversible error."
The State may well argue that the instruction on the lesser included offense of sexual abuse was a
Cb

mere variance", since sexual abuse is a lesser included offense of lewd conduct but that would be

incorrect. In the Colwell, supra, case outlined above, the defendant was, just as in the instant case,
contact
charged with lewd conduct, although his alleged lewd act was gen~tal-gen~tal

~11it1
1101

manual-genital contact, as alleged in the instant case. In the Colwell, supra, case, the trial court
instructed the jury on the lesser included offense of sexual abuse and the defendant was found guilty
of that lesser offense. The situation in the Colwell, supra, case was one where the prosecutor chose
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to charge the defendant with a single act of lewd conduct based upon a single specified act of genitalto-genital conduct and then other information beyond that was adduced at trial, much as was the case
here. The present case pretty much perfectly parallels Colwell, supra, case and the court should set
aside the verdict in this case as well.

CONCLUSION
Wether the court \vould elect to enter a judgement of acquittal or to order a new tr~al,~t
seems clear, for the reasons set forth above, that the defendant's conviction of the charge of sexual
abuse was not proper. It c a p o t stand.
day of August, 2007.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
THE STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Plaintiff,
VS.
JAMES ALLEN COCHRAN
Defendant.

Case No. CR06-32068
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN
OPPOSITION TO
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
ANEWTRIAL

COMES NOW, Justin D. Whatcott, Deputy Attorney General and Special
Prosecuting Attorney for ldaho County, who hereby submits this memorandum in
opposition to the Defendant's motion for a new trial. The State respectfully
requests the Court deny the Defendant's motion.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On May 8, 2006, the Defendant was charged by Information in the District
Court of ldaho County with one count of Lewd Conduct with a Minor in violation of
ldaho Code §18-1508. After several continuances of the trial date, the trial was
scheduled for March 5, 2007. On February 14, 2007 the State submitted to the
Court and to the Defendant a copy of the "State's Requested Jury Instructions."
(See Exhibit A). On February 21, 2007, the jury trial in this matter was continued
to May 15, 2007 due to the Defendant hiring new counsel. On May 1 I,2007 the
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Court provided the State and Defense counsel a copy of the Court's draft jury
instructions. Both the requested instructions filed by the State and the Court's
draft instructions gave the jury the option to find the Defendant guilty of the
included offense of Sexual Abuse of a Minor Under 16. At no time prior to trial did
the Defendant object to any of the jury instructions proposed by the Court or the
State.
On May 15, 2007, the jury trial was held in this matter. All of the evidence
was fully submitted to the jury on May 17, 2007. The jury instruction conference
was held on the morning of May 18, 2007 prior to closing arguments, where the
State indicated that it did not object to the Court's proposed instructions. Defense
counsel then made the statement that "I do not believe that the instructions are
inaccurate on the law," but then proceeded to submit an objection to the use of
ICJl 103A instead of lCJl 103, as the definition of reasonable doubt. The Court
overruled this objection and gave lCJl 103A as the instruction on reasonable
doubt.
At no time during the jury instruction conference did the Defendant indicate
that he objected to the inclusion of the instructions on the lesser included offense
of Sexual Abuse of a Minor, or that he thought those instructions did not accurately
reflect the applicable law. Prior to closing arguments, the Court read all of the
proposed instructions to the jury, which included instructions on the jury's option to
convict the Defendant of the included offense of Sexual Abuse of a Minor under
Age 16.
Approximately four hours into jury deliberations, the jury sent a note to the
court asking "What happens if we can't reach a unanimous verdict?" The Court
instructed the jury that it could give them no further instructions other than the ones
already provided. Approximately twenty minutes later, the jury returned a verdict of
Not Guilty on the charge of Lewd Conduct with a Minor, and Guilty of Sexual
Abuse of a Minor Under 16. The Defendant has filed a motion seeking a new trial.
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LEGAL ANALYSIS
1. Under ldaho Criminal Rule 30(b), the Defendant is prevented from

asserting error in the iuw instructions due to his failure to object
thereto prior to the jury retiring to consider its verdict.

The Defendant's asserts as his primary assignment of error the Court's
instructions giving the jury the option to convict the Defendant of the included
offense of Sexual Abuse of a Minor Under 16 in the event it acquitted the
Defendant of the charge of Lewd Conduct with a Minor. The Defendant asserts a
variety of legal theories in claiming that the giving of these instructions by the Court
constitutes error requiring a new trial. However, the Defendant fails to recognize
that he has waived any challenge to these jury instructions due to his failure to
object to them prior to jury deliberations. ldaho Criminal Rule 30(b) states:
... No party may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an
instruction unless the party objects thereto before the jury retires to
consider its verdict, stating distinctly the instruction to which the party
objects and the grounds of the objection.

This rule makes it clear that if a party fails to object to a jury instruction prior
to the jury deliberations, that party may not assign as error the giving of that jury
instruction. In this case, the Defendant failed to object to the jury instructions on
Sexual Abuse of a Minor, despite the fact that he was given notice of the State's
request three months prior to trial, was given notice of the Court's intent to give the
instructions prior to trial, and was given one more opportunity to object at the jury
instruction conference.

By indicating on the record that he believed the

instructions were accurate on the law, the Defendant stipulated to the giving of the
instructions on Sexual Abuse of a Minor. The Defendant's decision to stipulate to
the instructions on Sexual Abuse of a Minor prevents him from asserting the giving
of that instruction as error and grounds for a new trial under I.C.R. 30(b). In the
event that the Defendant attempts to argue that counsel's failure to object to the
instructions on Sexual Abuse of a Minor constitutes ineffective assistance of
counsel, it is clear that under ldaho Code §19-2406, ineffective assistance of
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counsel is not a valid ground for a motion for a new trial.

See State v.

Roberts,

129 Idaho 194,923 P.2d 439 (1996).
To allow the Defendant to now assert error in the giving of an instruction
that he stipulated to would be in direct conflict with I.C.R. 30(b), and would invite
criminal Defendants to inject error into proceedings in order to preserve their right
to obtain a new trial in the event of conviction. Additionally, allowing the Defendant
to challenge these instructions, despite his failure to object, would create extreme
prejudice to the State by eliminating any opportunity to cure any error in the
instructions by amending the charging language or proposing alternative
instructions prior to jury deliberations. Finally, under the circumstances of this
case, in the event that the jury was not instructed on Sexual Abuse of a Minor
Under 16, the State submits that the Defendant would not have been acquitted of
Lewd Conduct with a Minor.
Additionally, the Defendant has cited to State v. Colwell, 124 ldaho 560,
861 P.2d 1225 (Ct.App.1993) as authority for his motion for a new trial. However,
in Colwell, the Defendant objected to the giving of instructions on the included
offense of Sexual Abuse of a Minor. Further, the Court exercised "free review" of
the jury instructions, as that was the applicable legal standard at the time. Prior to
2004, the failure to object to a jury instruction did not constitute a waiver of any
objection to the instruction on appeal. However, since the decision in Colwell, The
ldaho Supreme Court passed ldaho Criminal Rule 30(b), effective July 1, 2004,
which prevents a criminal defendant from asserting error in a jury instruction unless
such instruction was objected to prior to the jury's deliberations. This change has
been recognized by the ldaho Court of Appeals. See State v. Lilly, 142 ldaho 70,
71, 122 P.3d 1170, 1171 (Ct.App.2005), State v. Anderson, 2006 WL 2974049
(Ct.App.2006).
Pursuant to ldaho Criminal Rule 30(b), the State respectfully requests that
the Court refuse to consider the Defendant's Motion for a New Trial to the extent it
relies on the challenge of the Court's instructions on Sexual Abuse of a Minor.
The Defendant was given three months to object to the request for the instructions
on the included offense and chose not to do so.

Further, Defense counsel
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indicated on the record that the instructions were accurate statements of the
applicable law. As such, the Defendant has stipulated to the giving of those
instructions and has waived the right to assert error in those instructions under
I.C.R. 30(b).

2. The Court correctly instructed the jury on the included offense of
Sexual Abuse of a Minor because it was requested by the State,
stipulated to by the Defendant, and a reasonable view of the evidence
supported a find in^ that the Defendant committed the crime of Sexual
Abuse of a Minor.
An offense may be deemed an included offense if the evidence adduced at trial
proves that such an offense was committed during the commission of the charged
offense.

See State V. Bolton, 119 ldaho 846, 810 P.2d 1132 (Ct.App.1991).

ldaho

Code §19-2132(b) provides that the Court shall instruct on a lesser-included
offense if:
(1) Either party requests such an instruction; and

(2) There is a reasonable view of the evidence presented in the case that
would support a finding that the defendant committed such lesser included
offense but did not commit the greater offense.
In this case, the State requested that the lesser included offense be given, as
evidenced by Exhibit A. Further, a reasonable view of the evidence presented
a trial could support a finding that the defendant committed the offense of
Sexual Abuse of a Minor, but not the offense of Lewd and Lascivious Conduct.
At trial, Amanda Hixon testified that while she was in bed with the
Defendant on March 3oth, 2006, the Defendant touched her breast area with
his hand, and that he subsequently placed his fingers inside her vagina,
pushing them in and out.

To rebut her claim, the Defendant presented

evidence by way of stipulation to show that the sheets on the Defendant's bed
were tested for DNA, and that none of Amanda Hixon's DNA was found on the
sheets. During opening and closing arguments, Defense counsel pointed out
that the lack of DNA, as well as the lack of any corroborating medical
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evidence, was grounds for the jury to disbelieve Amanda Hixon's testimony
regarding the alleged manual to genital contact.
However, no evidence presented during the trial contradicted Amanda
Hixon's testimony regarding the Defendant touching her breasts. In fact, the
Defendant's own evidence presented in the form of the testimony of Doris
Crocker, indicated that Amanda Hixon was in the bedroom with the Defendant,
and that the Defendant had his hands upon Amanda's body.

Although

Crocker claimed that this occurred because Amanda was "sleepwalking" and
had fallen on the Defendant while he was in bed, her own testimony
established that there was a short period of time that Amanda Hixon was in
the bedroom with the Defendant before Crocker got there.
Additionally, the testimony of Amanda Hixon was significantly
corroborated by the testimony of Chrissy Cochran and her prior statements.
Chrissy had previously indicated to Joan Renshaw that both she and Amanda
had gone to sleep with the Defendant in his bed, and that she had passed out
and "had no idea" what had happened between the Defendant and Amanda.
Chrissy admitted making these statements approximately three weeks after
the evening that this incident occurred. Further, the testimony of Chrissy
Cochran significantly corroborated Amanda Hixon's testimony regarding the
events leading up to the sexual contact that evening and Amanda Hixon's
actions subsequent to the sexual contact.

Finally, Chrissy Cochran's

testimony further corroborated Amanda Hixon's testimony by establishing that
she was in the bedroom with the Defendant and the Defendant had his hands
upon her.
Under the facts presented at trial, a reasonable view of the evidence
could support the assertion that the Defendant touched Amanda Hixon's
breasts (acts constituting Sexual Abuse of a Minor), but did not have manual
to genital contact with her (acts constituting Lewd Conduct with a Minor).
Although the State submits that the evidence established both actions
occurred, the aforementioned view of the evidence is reasonable given the
lack of corroboration regarding the acts constituting Lewd Conduct, the
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
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significant corroboration of the rest of Amanda Hixon's story, and the lack of
contradicting evidence regarding the acts constituting Sexual Abuse.
Therefore, under ldaho Code 919-2132, it was appropriate for the Court to
instruct on the offense of Sexual Abuse of a Minor. Even assuming that ldaho
Criminal Rule 30(b) did not prevent the Defendant's challenge to these
instructions, or assuming that the Defendant had objected to these
instructions, the Court was nonetheless correct to instruct on the included
offense based upon the evidence adduced at trial. As such, the Defendant's
claims that providing these instructions constitute grounds for a new trial are
without merit, and the Court should reject such argument and deny the
Defendant's motion.
3. The Court correctly instructed the iurv on the difference between
Lewd Conduct and Sexual Abuse

The Defendant claims that the Court did not adequately distinguish between
Lewd Conduct and Sexual abuse in its instructions. As stated above, ldaho
Criminal Rule 30(b) prevents the Defendant from asserting as error a jury
instruction that he failed to object to prior to jury deliberations. As such, the
Defendant cannot now assert error in the jury instructions as grounds for his
motion for a new trial.
Even assuming that the Defendant could challenge the jury instructions, or had
objected to the instructions regarding Sexual Abuse of a Minor, the instructions
adequately defined both offenses in light of the evidence presented at trial. During
the jury trial, Amanda Hixon testified that the Defendant touched her on her
breasts and that he had manual-genital contact with her. The jury instructions
listed the elements of both Lewd Conduct with a Minor and Sexual Abuse of a
Minor consistent with the statutory language and the ldaho Criminal Jury
Instructions. The elements instruction on Sexual Abuse of a Minor defines the act
as "caused or had sexual contact with A.J.H., not amounting to lewd conduct."
Further, "sexual contact" was defined by a jury instruction stating:
"Sexual contact" means any physical contact between the child and the
actor, or between children which is caused by the actor, or the actor
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
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causing the child to have self-contact, any of which is intended to gratify
the lust or sexual desire of the actor or some other person.
The effect of these jury instructions, coupled with the evidence presented at
trial, was that the jury was instructed to consider whether the Defendant committed
an act of manual to genital contact. If they determined that he did not commit that
offense, they could then determine if he had sexual contact with Amanda Hixon,
not amounting to lewd conduct. The evidence presented supported the allegation
that the Defendant had manual contact with Amanda Hixon's breasts, with the
intent to sexually gratify himself or his victim. This action constitutes Sexual Abuse
of a Minor under the statutory language and under the language of the jury
instructions. Additionally, because there was no other evidence indicating that the
Defendant committed other types of lewd conduct (such as genital to genital or
oral to genital contact), or any other types of sexual contact, there was no danger
that the jury would be confused about what actions the Defendant could be
convicted for. Therefore, the jury instructions provided in this case correctly and
adequately defined which action constituted Lewd Conduct, and which action
constituted Sexual Abuse. There is no danger of jury confusion in the application
of these instructions to the evidence presented. To the extent that the Defendant
wants to argue that the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Minor under ldaho Code $18-

1506 is unconstitutionally vague, no ldaho Court has ever held such.
find that
Under the facts in this case, the jury was given the option to either (I)
the Defendant committed an act of manual to genital contact, and if not, then (2) to
find that the Defendant committed an act of sexual contact not amount to Lewd
Conduct, or (3) find that the Defendant did not commit either sexual acts. What is
readily apparent from the verdict is that the jury did find that the Defendant
committed an act of sexual contact, not amounting to lewd conduct, with the intent
to arouse, appeal to, or gratify his own or Amanda Hixon's lusts, passions, or
sexual desire. This verdict is not contrary to the law as given in the instructions or
to the evidence presented in the case. Therefore, the Defendant has not shown
that any of the instructions relating to the included offense were sufficiently vague
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to confuse the jury. As such, his motion for a new trial on those grounds should be
denied.

4. Because the Defendant was given sufficient notice of the State's
request that the jury be instructed on the included offense of Sexual
Abuse of a Minor, there was no variance between the charging
document and the jury instructions.

Due Process requires that a Defendant be given notice of the allegations
against him so that he can protect himself from subsequent prosecution for the
same act and so he can prepare a proper defense.

See State v. Banks, 113 ldaho

54, 740 P.2d 1039 (Ct.App.1987). The United States Supreme Court has said that
"conviction upon a charge not made would be a sheer denial of due process."

&L

Jonge v. Oreqon, 299 U.S. 353, 362, 57 S.Ct. 255, 259, 81 L.Ed. 278 (1937).
Accordingly, the general rule has evolved that an accused person is denied
due process by variance between the crime charged in a prosecutor's information
and the crime upon which a judgment of conviction is entered. E.g., State v.
Cariaaa, 95 ldaho 900, 523 P.2d 32 (1974). However, there is a well-recognized
exception to this general rule. At common law, the prosecutor's charge of a
specific crime was viewed as giving presumptive notice of any lesser included
offense. State v. Padilla, 101 ldaho 713, 716, 620 P.2d 286, 289 (1980). ldaho
Courts have explained that a variance between the charging document and a jury
instruction requires reversal of a conviction only where the defendant was deprived
of fair notice of the charge against which he must defend or is left open to the risk
of double jeopardy.

See

State v. Jones, 140 ldaho 41, 49, 89 P.3d 881, 889

(Ct.App.2003), State v. Windsor, 110 ldaho 410, 417-18, 716 P.2d 1182, 1189-90
( I 985).
In the instant case, the Defendant was given notice of the allegations against
him by the filing of the information outlining the allegations against him. The filing
of this information additionally gave him constructive notice of the possibility that
he could be convicted of any included offense. Additionally, the Defendant was
given notice that the State was seeking instructions on an included offense by the
State's requested jury instructions, filed three months prior to trial. In this case, the
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
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Defendant cannot claim that his Due Process rights were violated by a lack of
notice of the allegations against him or the possible crimes for which he could be
convicted. Further, because the allegations made against him all arise from a
single transaction, this notice provides sufficient safeguards against the risk of
being placed in double jeopardy.
Even assuming that ldaho Criminal Rule 30(b) did not prevent his challenge to
these instructions or that he had objected to these instructions prior to jury
deliberations, the giving of these instructions did not amount to a Due Process
violation based upon a variance because of the significant notice provided to him
by the State and the Court. As such, the Defendant's claim that the instructions on
the included offense constitute a variance is contradicted by the procedural history
in this case, which gave him adequate notice under the Due Process clause, and
the Court should reject his claim that he is entitled to a new trial on these grounds.
5. The Defendant's reliance on State v. Colwell is misguided because the
facts of that case are distinguishable from the facts of the instant case
as no variance exists between the charging document and the
evidence presented at trial.

The Defendant has additionally claimed that under the rationale of the Court's
opinion in State v. Colwell, 124 Idaho 560, 861 P.2d 1225 (Ct.App.1993), the
conviction in this case should be overturned due to a variance between the
charging language and the evidence presented at trial. However, this argument
shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the facts and the basis for the opinion
in Colwell.

In Colwell, the Defendant was charged with one count of Lewd

Conduct with a Minor. The evidence presented at trial consisted of two main
components: (1) testimony and prior statements by the named victim that the
Defendant had sexual intercourse with her, accomplished by genital to genital
contact during the incident alleged in the information, and (2) testimony and prior
statements by the named victim that the Defendant had committed numerous prior
uncharged acts of sexual misconduct, including actions by the Defendant that
could constitute the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Minor.

STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
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The Court in Colwell instructed the jury on the elements of the included offense
of Sexual Abuse of a Minor despite the objections of the Defendant. However, the
Court did not instruct the jury that it could only find the Defendant guilty of the
included offense if they found he committed Sexual Abuse of a Minor during the
commission of the charged offense of Lewd Conduct.

The Defendant was

acquitted of Lewd Conduct with a Minor, but convicted of Sexual Abuse of a Minor.
After the trial, the Defendant filed a motion for a new trial based upon the Court's
instruction on the included offense. The trial court denied the motion, stating that
the jury could have concluded that the charged offense of Lewd Conduct did not
occur, but that the prior acts committed by the Defendant upon the victim did
occur, thus supporting a conviction for Sexual Abuse of a Minor.
The Court of Appeals reviewed the claim relating to the instructions on the
included offense, and stated that the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Minor could be
considered by the jury if there is evidence that the included offense occurred

during the commission of the charged oflense. See Id. at 565 (emphasis added).
However, in this instance, the Court failed to instruct the jury that it could only find
the Defendant guilty of the included offense if it found that such occurred during
the commission of the charged offense. As such, "the jury was permitted to find
that the incident giving rise to the charge of lewd conduct had not occurred, but
nonetheless could find Colwell guilty of sexual abuse" based upon acts which had
occurred throughout the two year period prior to the alleged incident of Lewd
Conduct. jcj.
The Court of Appeals reversed Colwell's conviction based upon the fact that
the jury was permitted to find him guilty for incidents of sexual abuse that were not
pled in the charging document. Specifically, the Court found that the "uncharged
acts should not have been relied upon by the jury as evidence that he committed
the included offense of sexual abuse of a child."

Id.

Because the facts did not

support any allegation that the Defendant committed any sexual acts other than
genital to genital contact during the commission of the charged offense, the jury
could not find him guilty of Sexual Abuse of a Minor. The Court based its decision
upon the fact that the instructions were overbroad and erroneous, constituting plain
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
(COCHRAN), Page II
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error. The Court further indicated that allowing the jury to convict the Defendant
based upon these prior incidents constituted a variance between the charging
instrument and the evidence presented at trial, and that it constructively amended
the information to charge him with "additional crimes that were separate and

distinct from the crime explicitly alleged."

Id.at 566 (emphasis added).

The instant case can be distinguished from the opinion in Colwell in a
number of substantial and material areas. First, the Defendant in Colwell objected
to the inclusion of the instructions on the lesser included offense. As stated above,
the 2004 amendment to I.C.R. 30(b) prevents the Defendant in this case from
challenging these instructions due to his failure to object to them. Secondly (and
most significantly), the evidence supporting the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Minor
in Colwell did not occur during the commission of the charged act, but rather were
evidence of prior, uncharged acts. This variance between the incidents of sexual
acts which supported the conviction for Sexual Abuse of a Minor, and the incident
alleged to constitute Lewd Conduct with a Minor was the grounds for the reversal
of the conviction. In contrast, the evidence in this case showed that the Defendant
touched Amanda Hixon's breasts during the commission of the acts charged as
Lewd Conduct. At no time has the evidence changed regarding the fact that the
acts constituting Sexual Abuse of a Minor occurred during the commission of the
alleged Lewd Conduct, and at no time was any other prior sexual misconduct
between the Defendant and the victim presented to the jury. Thus, although the
charges in Colwell were identical to the charges in this case, the facts and
evidence presented to the jury are materially distinguishable.
Finally, the instructions in Colwell were found to be an erroneous statement
of the law, as they were overly vague and broad, and instructed on an offense that
did not occur during the commission of the act charged. In the instant case, as
pointed out above, the instructions correctly and completely instructed the jury on
the Idaho law applicable to this case, including properly instructing them on the
included offense. Such a conclusion is supported by the comments of Defense
counsel at the jury instruction conference indicating that the instructions accurately
stated the law. Therefore, the facts and legal analysis in Colwell is significantly
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
(COCHRAN), Page 12
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distinguishable from the facts and legal analysis in the instant case. As such, the
Defendant's reliance upon this case as legal authority for his motion for a new trial
is in error, and the Court should recognize that the facts and conclusions in Colwell
are not applicable to the instant case.

CONCLUSION
Under Idaho Criminal Rule 30(b), the Defendant is prevented from asserting
error in the jury instructions due to his failure to object thereto prior to the jury
retiring to consider its verdict.

Even assuming the Defendant could validly

challenge the instructions, the Court correctly instructed the jury on the included
offense of Sexual Abuse of a Minor because it was requested by the State,
stipulated to by the Defendant, and a reasonable view of the evidence supported a
finding that the Defendant committed the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Minor.
Further, the Court correctly instructed the jury on the difference between Lewd
Conduct and Sexual Abuse.
Additionally, because the Defendant was given sufficient notice of the
State's request that the jury be instructed on the included offense of Sexual Abuse
of a Minor, there was no variance between the charging document and the jury
instructions. Finally, the Defendant's reliance on State v. Colwell is misguided
because the facts of that case are distinguishable from the facts of the instant
case as no variance exists between the charging document and the evidence
presented at trial. Therefore, the State respectfully requests that the Court deny
the Defendant's motion for a new trial, proceed to sentence the Defendant in
accordance with the recommendation detailed in the State's Sentencing
Memorandum, and enter a judgment of conviction on the offense of Sexual Abuse
of a Minor.

DATED this c d a y of October, 2007.

w

D

uty ttorney General

STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this <day

of October 2007. 1 caused to be

served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Sentencing Memorandum to:
Danny J. Radakovich
1624 G. Street
Lewiston, ID 83501
Fax (208) 746-4672

X U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid
-Hand Delivered
-Overnight Mail
X Facsimile
P

P
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ldaho Attorney General
STEPHEN A. BYWATER
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division
JUSTIN t). WHATCOTT
Deputy Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 332-3096

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,
VS.

JAMES COCWRAN,
Defendant.

1
1
Case No. CR-06-32068

)
)
)
)

STATE'S REQUESTED
JURY INSTRUCTIONS

1

1
)

COMES NOW, the State of Idaho, appearing through Justin D. Whatcott, Deputy
Attorney General and Special Prosecuting Attorney for ldaho County, State of ldaho and
does hereby request the attached jury instructions be given in the above-entitled case,
DATED this

\ZH'day of February, 2007.

~ $ u t y A t t o r n e General
~

STATE'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Page I

STATE'S EXH

"A"

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
1 HEREBY CERTIFY that on this /gm day of

, 2007, I caused to be

served a true and correct copy of the foregoing State's Requested Jury Instructions to:
Jonathon Hallin
Wilcox & Hallin
200 Park Street
P.O. Box 947
NcCall, ID 83638
Fax (208) 634-5880

$ U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid
-Hand Delivered

-Overnight Mail

-Facsimile

STATE'S REQUESTED JURY INSTRUCTIONS, Page 2

Oc t-02-2007

08: 1 lam

From-I DAN0 COUNTY D l ST COURT

INSTRUCTION NO.
In order for the defendant to be guilty of Lewd and Lascivious Conduct, the state
must prove each of the following:

1

On or about the 30'"ay

2.

In the state of Idaho

3.

The defendant James Cochran committed an act of manual-genital contact upon

of March, 2006

A.J. W.
4.

A.J.H. was a child under sixteen (16) years of age, and

5.

the defendant committed such act with the specific intent to arouse, appeal to, or
gratify the lust or passions or sexual desires of either of them.
If any of the above has not been proven beyond a reasonable doubt, then you

must find the defendant not guilty. If each of the above has been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, you must find the defendant guilty.

INSTRUCTION NO.
It is alleged that the crime charged was committed "on or about" a certain date. If
you find the crlme was commrfted, the proof need not show that it was committed on that

precise date

Oc t-02-2007

08 :12am

From- IDAHO COUNTY

Q I ST

COURT

INSTRUCTION NO.
To constitute lewd and lascivious conduct, it is not necessary that bare skin be

touched. The touching may be through the clothing.

Oct-02-2007

08:

12am

From-IDAHO COUNTV

Ql ST

COURT

INSTRUCTION NO.

The law does not require as an essential element of the crime that the lust,
passions, or sexual desires of either the defendant or A.J.H. be actually aroused,

appealed to, or gratified.

WL r-UL-ruur

uu: i ~ a m

prom-IVAHU LUUiYIY Ul ST COURT

12089832376

T-308

P.019/033

F-449

INSTRUCTION NO
You are instructed that it is not a defense to the crime of Lewd and Lascivious
Conduct or to the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Minor that A.J.H. may have consented to
the alleged conduct.

Bct-02-ZOO7

08:lZam

From-IDAHO COUNrY OlSr COUKI

INSTRUCTION NO.
In these jury instructions, the following words have the meanings stated:

"Sexual contact" means any physical contact between the child and the actor, or between
children which is caused by the actor, or the actor causing the child to have self contact,
any of which is intended to gratify the lust or sexual desire of the actor or some other
person.

Oct-02-2007

08: 12am

From-IDAHO COUNTY DIST COURT

INSTRUCTION NO.
In this case you will return a verdict, consisting of a series of questions. Although
the explanations on the verdict form are self explanatory, they are part of my instructions
to you. I will now read the verdict form to you. It states.
"We, the Jury, for our verdict, unanimously answer the questions submitted to us
as follows-

QUESTION NO. 1: Is James Cochran not guilty or guilty of Lewd and Lascivious
Conduct in Count I?
Not Guilty
Guilty
If you unanimously answered Question No. 1 "Guilty", then you should simply
sign the verdict form and advise the bailiff. If you unanimously answered Question No. 7
"Not Guilty", then you should proceed to answer Question No. 2.
QUESTION NO. 2: Is James Cochran not guilty or guilty of Sexual Abuse of a
Minor in Count 17
Not Guilty
Guilty
The verdict form then has a place for it to be dated and signed. You should sign
the verdict form as explained in another instruction.

Oc t-02-2007

08 :12am

12089832376

From- IDAHO COUNTV OI ST COURT

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)

Case No. CR-06-32068
Plaintiff,
VS.
JAMES COCHRAN,

Defendant.

We, the Jury, duly empaneled and sworn to try the above entitled action, for
our verdict, unan~mouslyanswer the question(s) Submitted to us as follows.
QUESTION NO. 1: Is James Cochran not guilty or guilty of Lewd and

Lascivious Conduct in Count I?

Not Guilty

Guilty -

If you unanimously answered Question No. 1 "Guilty", then you should
simply sign the verdict form and advise the bailiff. If you unanimously answered
Question No. 1 "Not Guilty", then you should proceed to answer Question No. 2.
QUESTION NO. 2: Is James Cochran not guilty or guilty of Sexual Abuse

of a Minor in Count I?
Not Guilty

Guilty

Next, you should simply sign the verdict form and advise the bailiff.
DATED this

day of

Presiding Juror

f ,I l:

A 3 . b

,2006
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TO:

--'3

%E-s.jj. CoQ-f-R4ri

Tim me hereby noti3eii fhaf you havepZedguil@or h e beenfoundguilv of a sex oflense

& x r i M i n L C. 18-8304 and that by remon there08 yo@are required to register, in wrifing with
the Shenys O@ce andgive your w m t a&ess in any county in the sfate of IdahoI which you
enterjm the pzcrpose of residing there either temporarily, or pemtcrnent&. You m t register with
fhe Shen$@s
O$ce withkfive (5) &s

a j b coming in to a c m r y andshalt conrme ro comply with

thcprovisicms of this chapterfor life while residing in Idaho,
Ifyo"" change your &es,

you mmt iqfonn fhe law enforcement Qgencywrth whom ycnr last

registered, of the new udiress, in writing, withinfive (5;) days of each change.

@you

failto regisfer or ifyoufail to give notice of a change of address, you will be p i &

of

afelary and can be punished by imprisonmentfor a period not to exceedfjve (T) years and afine

not to excegd $5,000.00.
DATEDthis

Ray of

0~
/'b/3&&

I have read or had read to me and do understand the above notice.

Signed:

Witnessed by:

, 2-7

~

11/16/20B/

1I': 43

12B814b4hf2

DANNY J KAUAKUVJGH
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Danny J. Radakovich
Radakovich Law Office
Attclmey fox Defendant
1624 G Street
Lewiston, Idaho 83501
(208) 746-8 162
Idaho State Bax #I991

IN THE DlSTRICT COURT OF TXXE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AXVD FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

1

STATE OF IDAHO,

Plaintiff,

1
1
1

)

v.

JAMES A C O C W ,

Defendant.

CASE NO. CR 2006-32068

AFFIDAVIT OF
DI\SISNY J. RADAKOVKCH

1

)
)

1

D

M J. RADAIK;OVICH, being first duly s w m , on oath deposes and says:

2.

That your affiant was been retained as the attorney for the Defendant in the above-

entitled matter; that, immediately following the sentencing in this matter, the defendant vehemently
expressed to your aEant that he wished your affiant to continue to pursue this matter through the
courts;
2.

That the Defendant paid an initial retainer and, since then, despite repeated requests,

has made only token payments since then against the continually rising balance owed; that, at thfs
AFFIDAVIT OF
DANNY J. RADAKOVXCH

RADAKOWCH LAW OJWCE
1624 C Street,
Lewbton, ID 83501

DANNY J

RADAKOVICH

PAGE

point in time, your affiant is owed nearly $7,000.00, which is neaxly double the amount: of the
original retainer; that, in addition, your affiant has explained to the defendant, through Doris
Crocker, the amounts needed for up front costs to appeal;

3.

mat your affiant has clearly expressed to the defendant, b o a personally and though

Dons Crocker, that he is unwilling to proceed further in this matter until brought cumnt;
4.

That your afiant has received vague assurances from Doris Cxocker that she is

attempting to obtain the funds necessary to proceed and your affiant has spoken with a relative to
Doris Crocker, who indicated that he would talk to her about helping her with the money; that,
despite this, no money has been forthcoming; that, even though no money has been forthcoming,
Doris Crocker has still been requesting that your affiant proceed; that, on or about November 9,

2007, your amant wrote to the defendant and Doris Crocker to advise that, ifthemonies needed were
not forthcoming by November 13,2007, he would move to *vxtfidmw;
5.

That no monies have been received and your affiant believes that he needs to

withdraw at this point, not only fox his own sake but also for the sake of the defendant; that the date
for filing the defendant's in this mattex i s rapidly approaching and, in your affiant's opinion, an
appeal should be filed, as well as other avenues be pusued but, if your affiant were to file an appeal,

he would have to post Qe cost of the clerk's xecord and transcript and the defmdant has not
advanced the hnds to pay those costs; that your afXiant is not willing to advance those costs, since
he is already owed a huge sum;

6.

That, if your affiantwithdraws and a public defender is appointed, the appeal could

be filed timely and the State would bear the cost of the clerk's record and transcript;

AFrnAVIT OF
DANNY J. RAIS)MOVXCH

RADAKOVICH LAW OFFJCE
1624 G Street,
Lewlston, ID 83501

05

DANNY J RADAKOVICH

7.

PAGE 06

Fuxtheryowaffi~tsaithnot..

DATBD thi&d&

STATE OFXDAHO

of November, 2007.

1
:

ss.

County of Nez Pewe )

DANNY J. RADAKOVICH, being first duly sworn, on his oath deposes and says:
R

That he has read the foregoing document and well

therein stated are true, as he verily believes.

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to

State of Idaho, residing at Lmiston.
My commission expires on 10131/07

I hereby certiljr that a true
copy of the foregoing instrument was
faxed to:
Justin D. Wiclatcorr
Deputy Attorney General
P. 0. Box 83 720
Boise, IZI 83720

and mailed, first-classpostage prepaid,
to:

AI;FII)AVlrT OF

DANNY J. RADMO'VICH

RADAKOVICH LAW OFFICE
1624 G Street,

Lewiston, ID 83501

DANNY J

RADPXOVLCH

PAGE

James Cochran and Doris

Crocker
P. 0. Box 302

AFFIDAVIT OF
DANNY J. RADAKOWCW

RADAKOVICH L A W OFPICE
1624 G Street,
Lewiston. 1D 63501

07

Adam H . Green
Attorney at Law
ISB No. 6992
136 N. State Street
P . O . Box 246
Grangeville, ID 83530
Phone: (208) 983-3089
Fax: (208) 983-3098
6

11 ~ t t o r n efor~ Defendant
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF IDAHO
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

JAMES COCHMN,

)
)

AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES C O C H M IN
SUPPORT OF -ED
MOTION FOR
REXlUCTION OF SEXI!E%CE

1
)

Defendant.

County of Ada

Case No.: CR-2006-32068

)
)
)

VS.

STATE OF IDAHO

)
)

)
)
)

1
ss.

JAMES COCHRAN, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes
and says:
1.

I am the above-named Defendant and make the following

averments upon my own personal knowledge and belief.
2.

I was convicted in Idaho County Case No. CR-2006-

032068 on October 12, 2007, for the crime of Sexual Abuse of a
Minor Under 16, a felony, pursuant to Idaho Code section 18-

3.

As a result thereof, I was sentenced to the custody

of the Idaho State Board of Correction, in Boise, Idaho, for a

Affidavit of James Cochran - 1

-

-.

I1
period of not less than five years, nor more than 15 years,

II

consisting of a minimum period of confinement of five years

IIduring which I am not eligible for parole or discharge, or
Ilcredit, or reduction of sentence for good conduct (except as

I!

provided

by

Section

20-LOID,

Idaho Code)

and

a

subsequent

indeterminate period of custody not exceeding 10 years.

4.

I was further ordered to make restitution to the

Idaho County District Court in the sum of $2,000.00, and to pay
court costs of $297.50.
5.

Since the date of my conviction in Idaho County Case

No. CR-2006-032068, there is new or additional information that
was not available to the Court at the time of sentencing that
shows

that

excessive

the

and

sentence

imposed

on

unreasonably

harsh

in

October
light

of

12,

2007

the

is

primary

objective of the criminal justice system in protecting society
and

the

related

goals

of

deterrence,

considers me to be her father.

rehabilitation

Elizabeth's biological father

died from cancer and I, for the last
Elizabeth as my own daughter.

and

years have raised

Although I am not married to

Elizabeth's mother, Doris Crocker, we have been in a monogamous
relationship for the past
7.

Since

the

& years.

date

of

my

conviction,

my

daughter,

Elizabeth Crocker, has been diagnosed with posttraumatic stress

Affidavit of James Cochran - 2

123

disorder, depression, and borderline personality disorder.

A

true and correct copy of a report from Dr. Andrew F. Jones, of
Hospital in Cottonwood, Idaho, attached hereto as

St. Nary's

Exhibit A, confirms this diagnosis.
Elizabeth has also been

8.

attending counseling with

Barbara Graziano, MSM, LCSW, at Camas Professional Counseling,
in Grangeville, Idaho.
opinion

of

Ms.

It is my understanding that in the

Graziano,

it

would

in Elizabeth's

be

best

interests, psychologically, if she were able to see me in a

A true and correct copy of correspondence

supervised context.
from

Barbara

Graziano

confirming

her

opinion,

is

attached

hereto as Exhibit B.
Elizabeth's

9.

mother

and my

partner,

Doris Crocker,

suffers from serious and debilitation medical conditions as
shown in the documents I have submitted previously.

If she

were to die while I am incarcerated, Elizabeth would be without
any parental figure.
10.

Based on the foregoing, the sentence I received on

October 12, 2007, for the crime of Sexual Abuse of a Minor
Under

16,

objective

is
of

unreasonably
protecting

harsh

society

in
and

light
the

deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution.
11.

FURTHER YOUR AFFIANT SAYETH NAUGHT.

/

Defendant

Affidavit sf James Cochran - 3

of

the

related

primary

goals

of

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN

b e f o r e m e on t h i s

13T fd a y

o f March

My commission e x p i r e s :

7- lo- r3

Affidavit of James Cochran - 4

Affidavit of James Cochran - 5

EXHIBIT A
Affidavit of James Cochran
State of ldaho v. James A. Cochran
ldaho County Case No: CR-2006-032068

-

ST. MARY'S HOSPITAL
PO BOX 137,701 LEWISTON S r .
CO-ONWOOD, ID 83522
(208) 962-3251

8

i

EMERGENCY ROOM REPORT
PATIENT NAME:

HOSPITAL NUMBER:
ADDRESS:
PHYSICIAN:
DATE OF VISIT:

CROCKER, ELIZABETH
ti2680
Kooskia, ID
Andrew F. Jones, DO
12-29-07

"I

p

I

..

f

n

i

L

_

,

.

'

0 COPY

HISTORY OF PRESENT ILLNESS: She is a 15-year-ald female patient who is well-known to me.
She comes in with a superficial self-inflicted, almost scratch, of the left wrist area. It is not really a
laceration. The patient has a history of PTSD, sexual abuse, and depression. She probably has a
borderline personality. She is accompanied by her mother, a friend, and her
psychologistlcounselor.
PAST MEDICAL HISTORY:

As above.

MEDICATIONS:

1.
2.

Birth control pills
Possibly inhalers for asthma

SOCIAL HISTORY: She may have recently smoked marijuana and possibly smokes cigarettes.
PHYSICAL W I N A T I O N
GENERAL: She is actually laughing and is in good spirits. This is totally out of context with her
self-inflicted injury.
VITALS: Temperature is 98 degrees; pulse 78; blood pressure 144166; oxygen saturation 100%.
HEENT: Negative.
CHEST: Lungs are clear to auscultation.
HEART: Reguiar rate and rhythm.
ABDOMEN: Soft.
NEUROMUSCULAR: Exam shows a superficial scrape over the left radial volar wrist.
ASSESSMENT:

Self-inflicted wound.
a.
Posttraumatic stress disorder.
b.
Depression.
c.
Borderline personality.
We
will rule out drug abuse.
d.
rformed. She is started on Lexapro 10 mg a day. Mom, the
seled on the black box waming of antidepressants in teens. I
k she has a good support system. I offered the counselor an
feeis the patient is in a reasonably safe environment. Further
ted by clinical course.

: 01-03-08 0915

EMERGENCY ROOM REPORT
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EXHIBIT B
Affidavit of James Cochran
State of ldaho v. James A. Cochran
ldaho County Case No: CR-2006-032068

PO Box 627

March 3,2008

To Whom It May Concern:
I am writing in regard to Elizabeth Crocker and James A. Cochran. 11. I have been
seeing Elizabeth for individual psychotherapy for appmxirnately 15 months due to various
reasons. I am writing to recommend that she be able to see her fatber, and I believe that it
would be in her best interest psychologically. She has a bond with James that is
childlparental in nature, and I believe that being able tcl see:him will assist with her mental
health. However, f also believe that it would be inher best interest to have those visits
supervised by a profissional who specializes in this type of contact within families.
Therefore, I am recammending that EUzabeth be able to see James with supervision,
possibly therapeutic supervision.
Thank you for your time and consideration. I f you have any questions or concerns,
please contact me at (208)983423S.
Sincerely,

Barbant Chziano, MSW, LCSW
ClinjcianlChildren's Program Director
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

1

THE STATE OF:IDAHO,

j

Plaintiff,

)

Case No. CR06=32068

j

STATE'S MEMORANDUMIN
) OPPOSITION TO
) DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
) REDUCTION OF SENTENCE

vS.

JAMES ALLEN COCHRAN

1

Defendant,

COMES NOW, Justin D.Whatcott, Deputy Attorney General and Special
Prosecuting Attorney for ldaho County, who hereby submit8 this memorandum in
opposition to the Defendant's motion for a reduction in sentence under ldaho
Criminal Rule 35.

The State respectfully requests the Court deny the

Defendant's motion without the necessity of a formal hearing.
LEGAL ANALYSIS,

Under Idaho Criminal Rule 35, the Court may reduce or modify a sentence
within 120 days of the judgment of conviction. Where the legality of a sentence is
not challenged, a motion for reduction of sentence is simply a plea for leniency
which the court may grant in its discretion if it decides that the sentence originally
imposed was unduly severe. &,State

v. Suttoq, 106 ldaho 403,679 P.2d 680
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(Ct.App.1984). A defendant seeking a reduction in sentence under Rule 35 is not
entitled to have a hearing on his motion, as the determination of whether a hearing
is necessary is within the discretion of the trial court,
State v, HoRma~,112
Idaho 114,730 P,2d 7 034 (Ct'App. 1988). Where a sentence was not excessive
when pronounmd, the defendant caries the burden of showing that the sentence
its

excessive based upon new or additional information, &g State v. S~rlnaer,122

ldaho 544,835 P.2d 1355 (Ct.App. 1892).
The Defendant, James Cochran, has fled a timely Rule 35 motion seeking
reduction of sentence. The amended motion does not challenge the legality of the
sentenw imposed in this case, but rather seeks a reduction based upon "new or
additional information" that was not available to the court at the time of sentencing.
evidence that his
The new information provided by the defendant consists of (I)
girlfriend. Doris Crocker, suffers from medical problems relating to diabetes and
renal failure, and (2) evidence that Ms. Crocker's daughter, Chrissy (whom the
defendant previously adopted), suffers from psychological problems relating to
post-traumatic stress disorder and depression,
The State submits that this evidence is not "new or additional evidence" that
was unavailable at the time of sentencing, nor is it sufficiently compelling to render
the defendant's sentence "unduly severe." At the jury trial in this matter, Doris
Crocker testified as to her medical problems in relation to her recollection of the
events underlying the criminal charges against the Defendant, Evidence was also
presented at the jury trial that the Defendant had adopted Ms. Crocker's daughter,
Chrissy. Furthermore, at the sentencing in this matter, the Defendant pleaded with
the Court to allow him a period of probation such that he could continue to provide
financial and emotional support to Ms. Crocker and her daughter. The Defendant
cited to his close relationship with Ms: Crocker's daughter as evidence that he was
not a danger to society and that probation was an appropriate sentence.
Therefore, much of the evidence cited by the Defendant in his Rule 35
motion has actually been presented before the court in this case. Further, the

letter prepared by Barbara Grazisno establishes that she has been counseling
Elizabeth (Chrissy) Crocker since January of 2007. As such, the information
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Page 2

35TO RULE 35 MOTION (COCHRAM),

NIAK. 1 8 . l u u d 1

u : jyAM

11) A 1 \ M Y GtN

-

N0.897

SPU

P. 4

@$

relating to Chrlssy's psychological problems was available to the Defendant at the

time of sentencing, and he ohosa not to present such evidence to the Court as
mitigation. Given that Chrissy's medical histoty indicates a history of sexual

abuse, and she has previously alleged the Defendant sexually abused her, it is
likely that her psychological issues are at least in part due to the Defendant's
actions. It Is further likely that this is the reason why the counselor recommends
supervised contact between them, Such supervised contact could be
accomplished by having Chrissy Cracker visit the Defendant at his place of
incarceration.
The State further submits that this evidence is of little consequence when
analyzing whether the sentence for the Defendant is unduly severe. The
Defendant was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor and sentenced to 15 years
with 5 years determinate and 10 years indeteninate. This sentence is 10 years
less than the maximum penalty for sexual abuse of a minor and only 713 of the
total sentence is fixed. Given that the Defendant provided a 13 year old girl with
alcohol, had her sleep in his bed with him, and then touched her sexually, this
sentence is appropriate when weighed against his conduct. Furthermore, at the
time of sentencing, the Defendant's history revealed 7 prior allegations of sexual

misconduct, including allegations that he abused Chrissy Crocker, and proof that
he was dishonorably discharged from the Army for sexually abusing a 5 year old
girl. As such, the prlmary goal of sentencing this defendant in this case was the
protection of society. The Defendant's plea to allow a lesser sentence so that he
can re-connect with one of his prior viotima directly contradicts this goal of
sentencing,
CoNCLUsloN,

The information provided by the Defendant is not new information that was
unavailable at the time of sentencing. Additionally, this information does not
render the sentence previously imposed as "unduly severe." Therefore, the
Defendant has failed to meet his burden of showing that the original sentence was
unduly severe based upon new or additional Information, As such, this Court
STATE'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO RULE 35 MOTION (COCHRAN),
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should deny the Defendant's Rule 35 motion wfihout the necessity of a formal
hearing, The State reape~flullyrequests that the Court enter such an order,

DATED thls&aay

of March, 2008.

0

D e w t t o m e y General

CERTIFICATE OF-SERVICE

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this &?day of March 2008, 1 caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Oppoaition to
Rule 35 Motion to:
Adam HaGreen
136 N, State Street
Grangeviile, 11) 83530

X U.S. Mail Postage Prepaid
- Hand Delivered

-Overnight Mail
-Facsimile

y
osean Newman, Legal Secretary
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OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND ITOR7.1% COUNTY OF
STATE 01;IDAf-10,
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Case NO.
Plaintiff,
)

VS.
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AFFIDAVIT OF
DEFENDANT

1
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1

Defendant.

-

A

STATE OF IDAHO

1

> ss
1

county of2-AAo
/

, after

and says as follows.

/9me, c

d

AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT - I
Revised: 10113!05

first being duly sworn upon hisher oath, deposes

p
p

Further your affiant sayeth naught.
DATED This

/

day of
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SUBSCRIBEI) AN11 SWORN to before me this _i day of
4t.-;3,
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d
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(SEAL)

AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT - 2
R r v ~ s e d :I Oil 3105

ilhTotary Public for 1d"ao
Commission expires:

T- (0- 13

0 ~ .

I IIEM<RY ('ERTIFY that on the -1- day of
20@,

>

I mailod a true and conact copy of the I)EFENDAN'I.'S AI'FIDAVIT via prison luail

system for processing to the U.S. niail system to:

County Prosecuting Attorney

D

ndant
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AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT - 3
Revised: 10/13105

~dahoCounty
Sheriff's Office
John J. Nida, Chief Deputy
Larry Dasenbrock, Sheriff
320 West Maln Crdngevllle, ID 83530
Phone 208-983-1 100 Fax 208-983-1 359

March 24,2008
To Whom It May Concern:
James Allen Cochran 11, date of birth March 17, 1964, served the following days in the
Idaho County Jail.
April 24,2006 through May 5,2008 and October 12,2007 through October 30,2007
when he was released to the State Department of Corrections.

?

Trudy L. S1
Administrative Assistant

To Protect and Serve
www.idahocountysheriff.org
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MOLLY J. HUSKEY
State Appellate F1ublic Defender
State of ldaho
I.S.B. # 4843
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SARA B. THOMAS
Chief, Appellate Unit
I.S.B. # 5867
3647 Lake Harbor Lane
Boise, ldaho 83703
(208) 334-27 12
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR IDAHO COUNTY
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
V.

JAMES A. COCHRAN,
Defendant-Appellant.
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NOTICE OF APPWL

1

TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE
PARTY'S ATTORNEYS, DENNIS ALBERS, IDAHO COUNTY PROSECUTOR,
416 WEST MAIN STREET, P.O. BOX 463, GRANGWILLE, ID, 83530. AND
THE CLERK OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT:
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1.

The

above-named appellant appeals against the

above-named

respondent to the ldaho Supreme Court from the Order Vacating and Reentering Judgment of Conviction entered in the above-entitled action on the 1 7 ' ~
day of July, 2008, the Honorable Jeff M. Brudie, presiding.
2.

That the party has a right to appeal to the ldaho Supreme Court, and the

judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders
under and pursuant to ldaho Appellate Rule (I.A.R.) I1(c)(l-10).

3.

A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the appellant then

intends to assert in the appeal, provided any such list of issues on appeal shall
not prevent the appellant from asserting other issues on appeal, are:
(a)

Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence?

(b)

Did the district court abuse its discretion by imposing an excessive
sentence?

4.

There is a portion of the record that is sealed. Those portions of the

record that are sealed are the Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) and
Memorandum of Law (Filed Under Seal) filed March 29, 2007.

5,

Reporter's Transcript. The appellant requests the preparation of the

entire reporter's standard transcript as defined in I.A.R. 25(c). The appellant
also requests the preparation of the additional portions of' the reporter's
transcript:
(a)

Jury Trial held on May 15-18, 2007, including, but not limited to, the
opening

statements,

closing

arguments,

jury

instruction

conferences, and orally presented jury instructions (Court Reporter:
Sheryl Engler, no estimation of pages was listed on the Register of
Actions); and
(b)

Sentencing Hearing on or about October 12, 2007 (Court Reporter:
Sheryl Engler, no estimation of pages was listed on the Register of
Actions); and
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(c)

JJY

LVU

STATE APPELLATE PD

Lab3

Status Conference held on March 3, 2008 (Court Reporter: Sheryl
Engler, no estimation of pages was listed on the Register of
Actions).

6.

Clerk's Record.

The appellant requests the standard clerk's record

pursuant to I.A.R. 28(b)(2). The appellant requests the following documents to
be included in the clerk's record, in addition to those automatically included under
I.A.R. 28(b)(2):
(a)

Transcript of Preliminary Hearing held on May 5, 2006, and filed on
June 13,2006;

(b)

Affidavit of Jonathon D. Hallin in Support of Defendant's Motion to
Vacate Trial Setting filed December 4, 2006;

(c)

All proposed and given jury instructions including, but not limited to,
the Defendant's Requested Jury Instructions filed February 12,
2007, State's Requested Jury Instructions filed February 14, 2007,
and Jury Instructions Given filed May 18, 2007;

(d)

@I
004/007

State's Objection to Defendants Requested Jury Instructions filed
February 14,2007;

(e)

Affidavit of Danny J. Radakovich filed February 20, 2007;

(f)

Affidavit filed March 28, 2007;

(g)

Memorandum of Law (Filed under Seal) filed March 29, 2007;

(h)

Notice of Jury Trial Witnesses and Exhibits filed May 11, 2007;

(i)

Stipulation of Fact filed May 18, 2007;

(j)

Psychosexual Evaluation filed August 21, 2007;
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(k)

Sentencing Memorandum lodged August 23, 2007;

I

(I)

Brief in Support of Post Trial Motions lodged August 28, 2007;

(m)

State's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for a

I
1

New Trial filed October 8,2007;
(n)

IDOC Notice of Duty to Register by Sex Offender filed October 15,
2007;

(0)

Affidavit of Danny J. Radakovich filed November 19, 2007;

(p)

Affidavit of James Cochran in Support of Amended Motion for
Reduction of Sentence filed March 18, 2008;

(q)

State's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Reconsideration of Sentence lodged March 28, 2008;

(r)

Affidavit of Defendant filed April 3, 2008;

(s)

Affidavit of James Cochran in Support of Amended Motion for
Reduction of Sentence filed March 18, 2008;

(t)

State's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for
Reduction of Sentence lodged March 28, 2008;

(u)

Affidavit of Defendant filed April 3, 2008; and

(sJ

Any exhibits, including but hot limited to letters or victim impact
statements, addendurns to the PSI or other items offered at
sentencing hearing.

7.

1 cert'ffy:

(a)

That a copy of this Amended Notice of Appeal has been served on
the court reporter Shetyl Engler;

'
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(b)

That the appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the
preparation of the record because the appellant is indigent. (Idaho
Code $j§
31-3220, 31-3220A, I.A.R. 24(e));

(c)

That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in a
criminal case (I.C.

(d)

$5 31-3220, 31-3220A, I.A.R. 23(a)(8));

That arrangements have been made with ldaho County who will be
responsible for paying for the reporter's transcript, as the client is
indigent, ldaho Code $3 31-3220, 31-3220A, I.A.R. 24(e);

(e)

That service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to 1.A.R 20.

DATED this 14th day of August, 2008.

State ~ p p e b t e
Public ~ e f e n d w

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 1lth
day of August, 2008, caused a

true and correct copy of the attached NOTICE OF APPEAL to be placed in the

United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to;
DANNY J RADAKOVICH
1624 G STREET
LEWISTON lo 83501
SHERYL ENGLER
COURT REPORTER
PO BOX 8068
MOSCOW ID 83843
DENNIS ALBERS
IDAHO COUNTY PROSECUTOR
416 W MAIN STREET
PO BOX 463
GRANGEVILLE ID 83530
KENNETH K JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNW GENERAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
PO BOX 83720
BOISE ID 83720 0010
Hand delivered to ABomey General's mailbox at Supreme Court

Administrative Assistant
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